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OBSCURED BY “WILLFUL BLINDNESS”:
STATES’ PREVENTIVE OBLIGATIONS AND
THE MEANING OF ACQUIESCENCE UNDER
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

Jon Bauer*
ABSTRACT
As U.S. asylum law becomes more restrictive, relief under the
U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT) has become the last hope for
safety for many asylum seekers. But for those who face torture at the
hands of non-State actors, CAT relief has proven extraordinarily hard
to win. The CAT’s torture definition encompasses privately-inflicted
harm only when it occurs with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official. Agency decisions initially took this to mean that officials
must willfully accept or tacitly approve the private party’s actions.
Courts have rejected that approach as overly restrictive. But what
they have adopted in its place—a “willful blindness” test under which
CAT applicants must show that officials would turn a blind eye to the
torture they face—is also problematic. Under this standard, even
where government officials take only half-hearted or patently
inadequate steps to combat acts of privately-inflicted torture such as
domestic violence, honor killings, gang violence, or mob attacks on
LGBTQI people, courts frequently conclude that acquiescence has not
been shown. As long as officials are doing something, the decisions
reason, they are not willfully blind.
This Article argues that willful blindness should not be the
test for acquiescence. The term “acquiescence” is defined in a Senate
*
Clinical Professor of Law and Richard D. Tulisano Scholar in Human
Rights, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to Deborah Anker,
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Richard A. Wilson, A.C.E. Bauer, Lori Nessel, Molly
Land, and Valeria Gomez for their helpful comments; to Adam Mackie and other
members of the UConn Law School library staff for excellent research assistance;
and to the staff of the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, especially Sneha
Pandya, for careful and thoughtful editing.

2021]

Obscured by “Willful Blindness”

739

ratification understanding to require that a public official have
awareness of the torturous activity and breach a legal responsibility
to intervene to prevent it. This definition, which has been
incorporated into U.S. law, makes clear that when officials are aware
of torturous activity—and in most cases there is no doubt that a
country’s government is aware of widespread patterns of abuse—
what matters is whether they breach their legal responsibility to take
preventive action.
Drawing on previously overlooked aspects of the history of the
CAT’s drafting and U.S. ratification, this Article argues that officials
acquiesce to torture if they fail to meet their legal responsibility
under international law to take effective preventive measures. The
State’s responsibility to exercise “due diligence” to prevent,
investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of torture by non-State actors
is widely recognized under the CAT and other human rights treaties.
The U.N. Committee Against Torture has found that when States fail
to exercise due diligence, they enable private parties to commit acts of
torture with impunity, and thereby acquiesce. That approach accords
with how the U.S., during the treaty negotiations, originally defined
“acquiescence” when it proposed adding the term to the CAT’s torture
definition. It also fits in comfortably with the text and purpose of the
treaty and its U.S. ratification understandings.
The Article concludes by considering what a due diligence
standard for acquiescence would look like in practice and addresses
potential objections to its appropriateness and administrability. It
also offers a proposal to amend the CAT regulations to clarify the
acquiescence standard.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT)1 established an international regime designed to “make more
effective the struggle against torture . . . throughout the world.”2 One
key strand in its web of preventive measures is Article 3’s
requirement that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.”3 The United States played an active role in the treaty’s
drafting,4 and, like most of the world’s countries, has ratified it.5
Since the 1990s, when the U.S. began applying Article 3 in
immigration proceedings, the CAT has offered the possibility of
protection for non-citizens who would face atrocious harm if deported
but cannot qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, the forms of

1.
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26,
1987) [hereinafter CAT].
2.
Id. pmbl.
3.
Id. art. 3(1). The French term refouler means to repulse or repel. See
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 180–82 (1993). In international
refugee and human rights law, the term “non-refoulement” is frequently used to
refer to the obligation of States not to return individuals to places where they will
face danger. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & LEAH ZAMORE, THE ARC OF
PROTECTION: REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME 60–68 (2019)
(discussing the origins and development of the non-refoulement principle).
4.
See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 101-30, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Report] (“Ratification is a natural
follow-on to the active role the United States played in the negotiating process for
the Convention”); 136 CONG. REC. 36, 196 (1990) (reflecting Senator Moynihan’s
statement prior to ratification vote that the U.S. “has invested enormous
resources in this convention. For 7 years our diplomats labored . . . [to make] its
obligations concrete, meaningful, and, as never before, enforceable.”); see generally
J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK 31–107 (1988) (providing a detailed account of
the CAT’s drafting history with many references to the U.S. role).
5.
The U.S. is among 171 ratifying countries. See Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/6XHZHMU2] (listing States parties).
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relief the U.S. provides to comply with U.N. treaties on refugees.6
Asylum and withholding are available only to persons who face
persecution because of their race, nationality, religion, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.7 In addition, there are
broad bars to asylum and (to a somewhat lesser degree) withholding
that disqualify many otherwise eligible applicants based on criminal
conduct, security risks, involvement in persecuting others, time spent
in a third country, or applying more than a year after entry.8
Protection under the CAT, in contrast, is absolute. The
United States can never send a person to a place where they would
face torture.9 It does not matter whether the torturer’s motivations
6.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, adopted Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). In 1968, the U.S. ratified the Refugee Protocol,
which incorporates and extends all the substantive provisions of the Convention.
To bring U.S. law into conformity with these treaties, the Refugee Act of 1980
created a statutory mechanism for granting asylum and broadened the scope of an
already-existing provision that allowed immigration judges to grant withholding
of removal. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (relevant
provisions codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158, 1231(b)(3)); INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1987) (discussing Congress’ intent to
conform U.S. law to the Protocol). Asylum provides a path to lawful permanent
residence and citizenship. Withholding of removal prevents deportation to a
specified country but confers fewer benefits and does not lead to a permanent
status. See Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 30–32 (1st Cir. 2017) (detailing the
differences). A grant of asylum is discretionary, however, in contrast with
withholding, which must be awarded if the applicant meets the eligibility criteria.
See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440–41, 443–44. Withholding requires proof
that persecution is probable, while asylum requires only a showing of “wellfounded fear”—a reasonable possibility of persecution. Id. at 423, 438–40.
7.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), (C).
8.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2), (b)(2), 1231(b)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(c),
1208.4(a), 1208.16(d)(2).
9.
International human rights law on torture allows no exceptions to the
non-refoulement duty because torture “constitutes the most direct attack at the
very essence of human dignity.” Walter Suntinger, The Principle of NonRefoulement: Looking Rather to Geneva than to Strasbourg?, 49 AUSTRIAN J. PUB.
INT’L L. 203, 204 (1995). All of the major international and regional human rights
instruments, going back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
proscribe torture. The prohibition has become part of customary international
law, and is widely recognized as one of the few norms, together with the
prohibitions of slavery and genocide, that has attained jus cogens status—a
peremptory norm that admits of no exceptions and is binding on States,
regardless of their consent. See Juan E. Méndez & Andra Nicolescu, Evolving
Standards for Torture in International Law, in TORTURE AND ITS DEFINITION IN
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relate to any of the five protected grounds for asylum. Torture
inflicted to coerce extortion payments, extract information, or punish
actual or imagined misdeeds can provide a basis for CAT relief.10 Nor
do any eligibility bars apply.11 The CAT entered the U.S. immigration
system in the 1990s as Congress was expanding the bars to asylum
and withholding,12 and courts and agencies were restrictively
interpreting the grounds on which those forms of relief could be

INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 215, 217 (Metin Başoğlu
ed., 2017).
10.
See Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“Significantly, relief under the [CAT] does not require a nexus to specific
statutory grounds.”). The CAT’s torture definition does require that severe pain or
suffering be inflicted “for such purposes as” those appearing on a list so broad that
it would cover just about any reason for deliberately inflicting severe pain, aside
from a doctor performing a painful but necessary medical procedure. CAT, supra
note 1, art. 1(1); see infra text accompanying notes 224–27 (discussing the CAT’s
purpose requirement).
11.
See Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 368 (B.I.A. 2002) (“An alien’s
criminal convictions . . . , however serious, are not a bar to deferral of removal
under the [CAT].”). Persons with serious criminal convictions, however, receive a
more tenuous form of protection. The U.S. regulations created two types of CAT
relief: withholding of removal under the CAT and deferral of removal. The
substantive eligibility standards are identical, and both protect against removal to
the country where the person would face torture. CAT withholding is available to
applicants not subject to any of the statutory bars to a grant of withholding of
removal; if a bar applies, only CAT deferral is available. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(4). CAT deferral is more easily revoked if conditions in the applicant’s
home country change, and in some circumstances, it allows for continued
detention. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(c), (d). This Article uses the term “CAT relief” to
refer to both varieties.
12.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) expanded the list of “aggravated felonies” that bar a grant of
asylum and frequently preclude withholding of removal as well. See Kristen B.
Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Treaty
that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 533, 533–34 (1998) (giving examples of
persons ineligible for asylum and withholding under IIRIRA for minor crimes,
including a woman who forged a $19.53 check). A sequence of statutory changes
also expanded the reach of terrorism-related bars, making them so broad that
“[l]ending a bicycle to Nelson Mandela when the African National Congress was
an outlawed anti-apartheid organization would have constituted material support
to a terrorist organization.” Maryellen Fullerton, Terrorism, Torture, and Refugee
Protection in the United States, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 4, 4, 16 (2011).
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granted.13 Advocates and commentators at the time hailed the CAT’s
bright promise as a viable alternative for asylum seekers.14
Recent immigration court statistics underscore the CAT’s
growing importance for those excluded by increasingly restrictive
interpretations of asylum law. In response to a surge in Central
American migrants fleeing gang violence, domestic violence, and
femicide, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and U.S. Attorney
General have issued a series of decisions making it harder for persons
targeted by these types of violence to establish that their persecution
fits into any of the five protected grounds.15 This forces asylum
seekers and their lawyers to more frequently bring arguments under
the CAT.16 The grant rate in immigration court for asylum and

13.
See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992) (rejecting a
claim that forced recruitment by a guerilla group constituted persecution based on
political opinion); Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding
that severe spousal abuse did not amount to persecution based on membership in
a particular social group), vacated, id. at 906 (A.G. 2001), effectively reinstated in
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 328–29 (A.G. 2018).
14.
See, e.g., Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against
Torture: A Viable Alternative for Asylum Seekers, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1773, 1773 (1997) (discussing how the CAT provides a new alternative method of
litigating asylum cases); Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Convention Against
Torture: A Viable Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 895, 900, 914 (2000) (discussing the significant relief that the CAT will
provide to victims of domestic violence).
15.
See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (both restrictively interpreting
the “particular social group” ground in cases involving applicants facing
retaliation for refusing to join or leaving a gang); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 320
(stating that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”);
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (A.G. 2019) (holding that harm inflicted
based on the victim’s family ties, a common motivator for gang violence, generally
will not amount to persecution based on social group membership).
16.
See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Real Message of R-A-F-, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS
ON IMMIGR. L. (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/3/1/thereal-message-of-matter-of-r-a-f- [https://perma.cc/V4JM-M7MJ] (“CAT generally
only comes into play where the applicant isn’t found eligible for asylum,
something which is happening more frequently as the current administration
churns out new bars and obstacles to eligibility.”); Steven H. Schulman, Judge
Posner’s Road Map for Convention Against Torture Claims When Central
American Governments Cannot Protect Citizens Against Gang Violence, 19
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 297, 298 (2017) (explaining that
the CAT “has become an increasingly important avenue for Central Americans
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withholding claims fell from 56% in 2014 to 28% in 2020.17 For a
growing proportion of asylum seekers, CAT relief provides the only
path to protection.18
Nonetheless, CAT claims rarely succeed. Over the most recent
five-year period, immigration judges granted only about 5% of CAT
applications that were decided on the merits.19
The state responsibility requirement in the CAT’s definition
of torture has been a major stumbling block for those seeking CAT
protection. Article 1 of the CAT, which was carried over essentially
verbatim into the U.S. regulations, defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason

seeking protection” as a result of decisions restricting asylum for those fleeing
gangs).
17.
All years referenced in this paragraph are fiscal years, not calendar
years. The combined grant rate for asylum and withholding of removal claims
(counting only cases that resulted in a decision on the merits) was 56% in 2014,
55% in 2015, 48% in 2016, 42% in 2017, 38% in 2018, 31% in 2019, and 28.4% in
2020. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS
YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 27 (2019) (displaying data for FY 2014 to FY
2018); Record Number of Asylum Cases in FY 2019, TRAC IMMIGR. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/
[https://perma.cc/JSM4-98FL]
(displaying data for FY 2019); Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, TRAC
IMMIGR.
(Oct.
28,
2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/
[https://perma.cc/X5RF-N7WG] (containing grant rate information for 2019 and
2020).
18.
From 2014 to 2018 (the last year for which published data on CAT
grants in immigration court are available), the vast majority of CAT grants (over
75%) were for CAT withholding rather than deferral of removal, which indicates
that the bulk of those getting CAT relief were found ineligible for asylum and
withholding of removal due to lack of nexus to a protected ground, and not
because they were subject to one of the criminal, terrorist, or other bars to
withholding. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS
YEARBOOKS, FY 2018 at 30; FY 2017 at 30; FY 2016 at M1; Fiscal Year 2015 at
M1; FY 2014 at M1; see also supra note 11 (explaining the withholding/deferral
distinction in CAT relief).
19.
The yearly figures (calculated from numbers of CAT grants and denials
reported in EOIR’s Statistics Yearbooks, supra note 18) were 4.8% in 2014, 6.0%
in 2015, 4.8% in 2016, 5.2% in 2017, and 4.8% in 2018.
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based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.20
Non-refoulement protection under Article 3 depends on showing that
a person “would be in danger of being subjected to torture” within the
meaning of that Article 1 definition.21
Consider how the CAT’s torture definition applies to the kinds
of cases most frequently heard in the immigration courts in recent
years—those of individuals and families fleeing threats from gangs or
drug cartels, domestic violence, or societal violence targeting women
and LGBTQI people.22 In most such cases there is little doubt that the
harm the applicant fears—brutal beatings, even more gruesome
mistreatment, or death—is severe enough to amount to torture.23 Nor
will it generally be a problem to establish that the pain or suffering
will be inflicted intentionally and for a punitive, coercive,
intimidating, information-extracting, or discriminatory purpose.24

20.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (emphasis added and second sentence
omitted); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (containing an essentially identical
definition).
21.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1)–(2),
1208.18(a) (further defining eligibility for CAT relief). The United States
interprets that standard to require proof that torture is “more likely than not” to
occur. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(2), 136
CONG. REC. 36,198–99 (1990) (establishing the U.S. understanding). The “more
likely than not” standard mirrors the U.S. standard for withholding of removal.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
22.
See, e.g., Laura Gottesdiener & John Washington, They’re Refugees,
Fleeing Gang Violence and Domestic Abuse. Why Won’t the Trump Administration
Let Them In?, THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/
article/archive/trump-asylum-gangs-domestic-violence/
[https://perma.cc/Y8EJQKJF].
23.
See Monica Fonesi, Relief Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture:
A Framework for Central American Gang Recruits and Former Gang Members to
Fulfill the “Consent or Acquiescence” Requirement, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
308, 320 (2008) (noting that courts assessing CAT claims in gang-based cases
have conceded the harm faced by applicants is severe enough to be considered
torture). Some claims, of course, are denied because the adjudicator disbelieves
the applicant’s story or finds the evidence insufficient to show that such harm is
likely.
24.
The intent requirement does stand as an obstacle to CAT relief in one
class of cases: those involving people who would face imprisonment or
institutionalization in their home country under atrocious conditions that result
from lack of resources, poor management, or negligence. See Matter of J-R-G-P-,
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The biggest obstacle, rather, is the torture definition’s requirement
that pain or suffering be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity.”25
For asylum and withholding, the refugee definition has long
been interpreted to cover harms inflicted by private groups or
individuals that a country’s government is unable or unwilling to
control.26 But for conduct by non-State actors to qualify as “torture”
within the meaning of the CAT, it must be shown that a public official
would, at a minimum, acquiesce to the torturous activity. The U.S.
regulations that implement the CAT in immigration proceedings
provide a specific definition for the term “acquiescence” which is
taken from one of the ratification understandings on which the
Senate conditioned its consent to the treaty:
Acquiescence of a public official requires that the
public official, prior to the activity constituting
torture, have awareness of such activity and
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to
intervene to prevent such activity.27
The U.S. jurisprudence interpreting this standard is, put
simply, a mess. The BIA and Attorney General, in early precedential
decisions addressing torture inflicted by guerillas or criminal groups,
held that “acquiescence” requires a showing that public officials are
“willfully accepting” or providing “tacit support” to private actors’
27 I. & N. Dec. 482, 484–87 (B.I.A. 2018) (finding that severe pain and suffering
caused by such detention conditions does not meet the CAT’s specific intent
requirement); Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 299–302 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding
that substandard detention conditions due to budgetary and management
problems do not amount to “torture”).
25.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (defining
torture under the CAT).
26.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining
persecution to include actions “either by the government . . . or by persons or an
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”); see also
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/ENG/REV.4 (1979,
reissued 2019) (stating that serious discriminatory mistreatment inflicted by the
local populace “can be considered as persecution . . . if the authorities refuse, or
prove unable, to offer effective protection”).
27.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d),
136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990) (establishing the U.S. understanding stating the
same).
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torturous activities.28 Federal courts of appeals have uniformly
rejected that interpretation, finding it contrary to clear indications in
the drafting history of the U.S. acquiescence understanding that the
word “awareness” was intended to encompass both actual knowledge
and “willful blindness.”29 Officials may turn a blind eye to torture
even if they don’t approve of it, the courts reason.30
Most judicial decisions, however, either expressly or implicitly
go a step further, treating “willful blindness” as the minimum
necessary condition to establish acquiescence. In other words, unless
an applicant can show that a public official is likely to be at least
willfully blind to (even if not participating in, instigating, or
consenting to) private acts of torture, courts will conclude that
acquiescence has not been established, and the CAT claim must fail.31
This Article argues that courts have made a conceptual error
by conflating willful blindness with acquiescence. The treaty’s U.S.
ratification history shows that willful blindness was merely intended
to be an alternative way to establish official awareness of torturous
activity. Once “awareness” is established—whether through actual
knowledge or willful blindness—the focus should turn to the next
question posed by the Senate understanding and regulation: is it
likely that a public official will “breach his or her legal responsibility
to intervene to prevent such activity?”32 While judicial opinions
sometimes recite that language, they give it no content. None of the
case law addresses where this legal responsibility comes from, or
what it requires.33 The decisions thus fail to consider whether officials
28.
Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (stating that to
show acquiescence an applicant must demonstrate that officials are “willfully
accepting” of the activity in question); Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280
(A.G. 2002) (denying CAT relief where there was no showing that the group the
applicant feared had “tacit support” from the government).
29.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9; see also infra Section I.A (tracing the
construction of “willful blindness” in this context).
30.
For discussion of this case law, see infra Section I.C.
31.
See infra Section I.D.
32.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The regulation is awkwardly phrased in the
present tense, but when the torture definition is applied in the context of removal
proceedings, the inquiry will always be prospective, asking whether it is probable
that a public official who has knowledge of, or is willfully blind to, the torturous
activity the CAT applicant fears will breach a legal responsibility to take
preventive action.
33.
Even the Second Circuit, the only appellate tribunal that has been
careful to emphasize that “willful blindness” bears only on awareness and breach

2021]

Obscured by “Willful Blindness”

749

have legal obligations—whether imposed by the CAT and other
international law or the domestic law of the officials’ own country—
that extend beyond a duty not to be “willfully blind” to torture.
A common CAT scenario shows why it matters that courts
have focused on “willful blindness” without considering other ways in
which officials may breach their legal responsibility. A country’s
government is aware—in fact, has actual knowledge of—a widespread
problem of torturous activity by non-State actors.34 It may be men
domestically abusing their spouses or partners; drug cartels
unleashing brutal violence on those who disobey them; families
threatening women with honor killings; or mobs physically attacking
LGBTQI people. The country’s government is not completely
indifferent to the problem—it recognizes the need to protect at-risk
groups and punish the perpetrators and has taken some preventive
and remedial measures—but its actions are woefully insufficient and
largely ineffectual. Corruption, indifference, or outright hostility by
some law enforcement officials, as well as failures at higher levels of
government to develop effective policies and allocate adequate
resources all may contribute to effective impunity for perpetrators
and an absence of effective protection for victims.35
When the State’s response to torturous conduct is assessed
under a willful blindness standard, it is all too easy for immigration
judges and reviewing courts to find no acquiescence in situations like
these. Courts frequently conclude that officials’ willingness to do

of legal responsibility is a distinct inquiry, fails to offer any guidance in its
decisions on the source and scope of the legal responsibility to prevent torture. See
infra notes 99–103, 122.
34.
Courts generally agree that to establish “awareness,” it is not necessary
to show that a public official has knowledge of the individual CAT applicant’s
specific situation; “instead, it is sufficient that the public official is aware that
torture of the sort feared by the applicant occurs.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d
1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing two earlier decisions in agreement); see also
Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 2017) (similar statement); Matter
of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1313 (B.I.A. 2000) (stating that the CAT applicant’s
burden was to prove that “officials acquiesce to the types of activities that the
respondent fears he would suffer at the hands of the guerillas”).
35.
See, e.g., Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr, 954 F.3d 813, 816–18 (5th Cir.
2020) (describing the deterioration of protections against gender-based violence in
Honduras since its 2009 coup, including governmental failure to effectively
implement legislation and provide adequate resources for preventive and
protective programs, and gender discrimination in the justice system, all of which
contributed to a doubling of homicides of women).
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something shows that they are not willfully blind to torture.36 The
negligence of public officials—the State’s failure to take necessary
and reasonable steps to combat torture of the type the applicant
faces—is hard to fit into the willful blindness box.
Shifting the focus away from “willful blindness” and toward
the second part of the regulatory test—whether officials who are
aware of the abuses “thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to
intervene to prevent such activity”—would, this Article contends,
provide a path to a more coherent jurisprudence that is truer to the
CAT’s purposes, and would also bring U.S. case law into harmony
with the prevailing international understanding of the CAT and other
treaties prohibiting torture. The legal responsibility of public officials
to intervene to prevent torturous activity derives from international
law as well as domestic legislation. U.N. treaty bodies and regional
human rights courts have reached a strong consensus that, under the
CAT and other human rights treaties, States have a legal
responsibility to exercise “due diligence” to prevent, investigate,
prosecute, and punish acts of torture by non-State actors.37 The U.N.
Committee Against Torture has found that when States fail to
exercise due diligence, they enable private parties to commit acts of
torture with impunity and thereby acquiesce, making the State
responsible under the CAT’s torture definition.38 A due diligence
approach to CAT acquiescence does not sweep quite as broadly as the
“unable or unwilling to control” standard, derived from refugee
treaties, that is used for asylum and withholding of removal.39 But it
is considerably more protective than the current willful-blindnessbased jurisprudence and provides an interpretation of acquiescence
that accords with the CAT’s text and purpose and the U.S.
ratification understandings.
In developing these ideas, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part I traces the origins of the “willful blindness” approach and the
path of agency and judicial interpretation that brought it to center
stage. It then examines the incoherence of the CAT case law that
36.
See infra Section I.D.
37.
See infra Section II.A.
38.
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation
of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008)
[hereinafter “Gen. Cmt. 2”]. The Committee Against Torture, which consists of ten
human rights experts elected by the States parties to the CAT, is charged with
monitoring compliance with the treaty. See CAT, supra note 1, arts. 17–24.
39.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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rests on “willful blindness,” and its inadequacy in addressing
situations where officials do little to protect a person at risk of
torture, or systematically fail to take measures needed to curb a
widespread problem of torturous violence.
Part II examines how international law has defined the scope
of State officials’ legal responsibility to intervene to prevent torture.
It traces the development of the “due diligence” standard and
explains why this approach is warranted as a matter of treaty
interpretation. This Part also considers evidence from the CAT’s
drafting history, largely overlooked in prior scholarship, which shows
that “acquiescence” made its way into the CAT via a U.S. proposal
that expressly tied the concept to a treaty-based obligation on the
part of officials to take all appropriate measures within their power to
prevent torturous conduct.
Part III examines the CAT’s ratification and implementation
history in the U.S. It concludes that the understanding of
acquiescence adopted by the Senate when it ratified the treaty
requires looking to all applicable sources of legal obligation,
international as well as domestic, when assessing whether officials
have breached their legal responsibility to prevent torture. Tellingly,
when the immigration agencies began to apply the CAT in the 1990s,
a memo from the INS General Counsel explained that the reference
to “legal responsibility” in the Senate understanding included
obligations under international law.
Part IV considers what a due diligence standard for
acquiescence would look like in practice and addresses some potential
objections to its appropriateness and administrability. It also contains
a proposal to amend the CAT regulations to clarify the meaning of
acquiescence.

I. THE TRAVELS AND TRAVAILS OF “WILLFUL BLINDNESS” AS THE
STANDARD FOR ACQUIESCENCE IN U.S. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
CAT
A. How “Willful Blindness” Entered the Picture
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CAT on December
10, 1984,40 and the treaty entered into force in 1987, after twenty
40.

G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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States had ratified it.41 The United States initiated its ratification
process in 1988, when President Reagan signed the CAT and
forwarded it to the Senate for its advice and consent.42 The Reagan
Administration put forward nineteen proposed conditions on U.S.
ratification, in the form of four reservations, nine understandings,
and four declarations.43 Five of the proposed understandings
concerned the CAT’s definition of “torture,” and one specifically
addressed the meaning of the term “acquiescence.”44
The Reagan Administration’s proposed conditions drew
criticism from human rights groups, the American Bar Association,
and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
undermining the CAT’s efficacy and sending a message that the
United States was not seriously committed to the fight against
torture. In 1989, the new George H.W. Bush Administration
negotiated with those groups, and in December it submitted a smaller
and revised package of conditions, which included a modified version
of the “acquiescence” understanding.45 In July 1990, the Senate
41.
See CAT, supra note 1, art. 27 (providing that the treaty would enter
into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the twentieth State
instrument of ratification or accession with the U.N. Secretary General); see also
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 109–10 (listing the ratifications that led to
the treaty’s entry into force).
42.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention Against Torture, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20 (1988) [hereinafter
President’s Transmittal].
43.
Id. at vi, 1–18; see also Senate Report, supra note 4, at 7, 11–28 (1990)
(reprinting the summary and analysis transmitted by the Reagan Administration
that contained its proposed conditions). Reservations are intended to alter and
limit U.S. obligations under a treaty, while understandings announce how the
U.S. intends to interpret a provision in a manner it views as consistent with
treaty requirements. Declarations are statements of intention regarding general
aspects of implementing the treaty. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 416–
23, 430–32 (2000); see also David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the
Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United States, 15 NOVA L.
REV. 449, 451–52 n.8 (1991) (explaining the distinctions of reservations,
understandings, and declarations).
44.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 3–5; see also Senate Report,
supra note 4, at 13–15 (reprinting the Reagan Administration’s discussion of its
“torture” understandings).
45.
See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,193 (1990) (statement of Sen. Pell); Senate
Report, supra note 4, at 4, 7–8, 35–38 (listing the Bush Administration
conditions); Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 101-718, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter
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Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of the treaty with the
Bush Administration’s proposed conditions,46 and the full Senate gave
its advice and consent on October 30, 1990.47 The CAT entered into
force for the United States on November 20, 1994, thirty days after
President Bill Clinton deposited an instrument of ratification with
the U.N. Secretary-General.48
It took several more years to incorporate the CAT’s nonrefoulement requirement into domestic U.S. law. As part of the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA),
Congress directed agency heads to “prescribe regulations to
implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the
[CAT], subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations and
provisos” in the Senate ratification resolution.49 In 1999, the Justice
Department promulgated regulations establishing standards and
procedures for the adjudication of CAT claims by immigration

Senate Hearing], at 1 (statement of Sen. Pell), 8–9 (prepared statement of State
Department Legal Advisor Abraham D. Sofaer), 45 (statement of Winston Nagan,
Chair, Amnesty International USA); see also Peder van W. Magee, The United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment: The Bush Administration's Stance on Torture, 25 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 807, 816 n.80 (1992) (discussing Sen. Pell’s pivotal role
in securing changes).
46.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 3, 29–31.
47.
136 Cong. Rec. 36,198–99 (1990). Some additional changes to the Bush
conditions were made via a floor amendment were worked out between Senator
Clairborne Pell, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, and Senator
Jesse Helms, the ranking Republican member. No change was made to the
“acquiescence” understanding. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,195–96 (1990).
48.
Declarations and Reservations Made Upon Ratification, Accession, or
Succession [United States], 1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994); see also CAT, supra
note 1, arts. 25(2), 27(2) (providing that the CAT enters into force for a country
thirty days after depositing its instrument of ratification with the SecretaryGeneral). When submitting the CAT to Congress, the Executive Branch made
clear that it did not intend to deposit an instrument of ratification until
legislation was enacted to implement Article 5, which required extending U.S.
criminal jurisdiction to cover acts of torture committed by U.S. nationals abroad
and acts of torture committed abroad by non-U.S. nationals later found in the
United States. See President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 9–10; Senate
Hearing, supra note 45, at 12, 40–41 (prepared statement and hearing testimony
of Abraham D. Sofaer). That legislation, known as the Torture Act, was not
enacted until 1994. Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (1994), codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2340, 2340A.
49.
FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, tit. XXII, § 2242(b), 112 Stat.
2681-822 (1998) (codified as note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
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judges.50 The Senate’s “acquiescence” understanding is included in
the regulations’ definition of torture.51
The
acquiescence
understanding
in
the
Reagan
Administration’s original package of proposed conditions read as
follows:
The United States understands that the term
“acquiescence” requires that the public official, prior
to the activity constituting torture, have knowledge of
such activity and thereafter breach his legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.52
The State Department analysis that accompanied the President’s
transmittal of the treaty indicated that this understanding, along
with several others relating to Article 1’s torture definition, was
“intended to guard against the improper application of the
Convention” in ways that could threaten “U.S. law enforcement
interests.”53 The concern, a State Department official later wrote, was
that because the CAT contemplates criminal prosecution of those
implicated in torture, the definition’s terms needed to be delineated
with “clarity and precision” to meet constitutional standards.54
With that concern in mind, the Administration’s analysis
stated: “[I]n our view, a public official may be deemed to ‘acquiesce’ in
a private act of torture only if the act is performed with his
knowledge and the public official has a legal duty to intervene to
prevent such activity.”55 The Administration also justified its
acquiescence understanding as consistent with the CAT’s limitation
of its scope to “torture that occurs in the context of governmental

50.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, Regulations Concerning the Convention
Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) [hereinafter CAT Regulations],
now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16–18.
51.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The Justice Department’s commentary notes
that the regulatory definition of torture “is drawn directly from the language of
the Convention, the language of the reservations, understandings and
declarations contained in the Senate resolution ratifying the Convention, or from
ratification history.” CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8482.
52.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5.
53.
Id. at 4.
54.
Stewart, supra note 43, at 449, 455–56; see also Senate Hearing, supra
note 45, at 14 (testimony by Justice Department official Mark Richard explaining
that the “acquiescence” understanding was “necessary to ensure that Article 1
complies with the due process requirements of the Constitution”).
55.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 4.
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authority, excluding torture that occurs as a wholly private act.”56
But, the explicit reference to “private act[s]” of torture, as well as the
wording of the understanding itself,57 makes clear that this reference
to the “context of governmental authority” was intended to include
situations where private actors engage in torturous activity and an
official who knows about it breaches a legal duty to take preventive
action.
The
Bush
Administration’s
revised
reservations,
understandings, and declarations package retained the Reagan
“acquiescence” understanding with one modification: it changed the
word “knowledge” to “awareness.” The State Department, in its letter
transmitting the revised conditions to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, explained that this change was made “to make it clearer
that both actual knowledge and willful blindness fall within the
meaning of acquiescence.”58 As a Justice Department official testified
at the Senate hearing on the CAT, the change reflected the fact that
“knowledge under our law includes not only actual knowledge . . . but
also willful blindness,” and was designed to ensure that an official
with “a duty to prevent the misconduct” would not be able to evade
56.
Id. at 4. This language was later echoed in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report approving the CAT, see Senate Report, supra note 4,
at 6, and in the Justice Department’s commentary to the implementing
regulations. CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8483. The Reagan State
Department’s analysis went on to draw an analogy to the “under color of law”
standard of civil rights statues. The phrase “under color of law” was incorporated
into two later statutes criminalizing and providing civil remedies for certain acts
of torture but does not appear in the Senate CAT understandings or U.S.
immigration regulations. See infra Part III.
57.
The phrase “activity constituting torture” (both in the original Reagan
Administration version and the revised version ultimately accepted by the Senate)
must be understood as referring to the first part of the CAT Article 1 definition of
torture, which defines the act—intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for
certain purposes—and not the definition’s final clause, which specifies the
circumstances in which the State is deemed responsible for such an act (“when
such pain or suffering is inflicted . . . with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official”). Otherwise, the understanding would be circular; it would be saying that
public officials cannot acquiesce to torturous activity unless they know the
activity is occurring with the acquiescence of public officials.
58.
Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Dep’t of State, to Sen. Pell (Dec. 10, 1989) (reprinted in Senate Report, supra note
4, at 35–36). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, endorsing the revised
understanding in its report, similarly stated that its purpose “is to make it clear
that both actual knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the definition of the
term ‘acquiescence’ in article 1.” Id. at 9.
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responsibility “by deliberately clos[ing] his eyes to what would
otherwise have been obvious to him.”59 When the Foreign Relations
Committee favorably reported the treaty to the Senate, it endorsed
the Administration’s explanation of the revised understanding’s
objective.60
The phrase “willful blindness” thus made its way into the
ratification history as a gloss on the meaning of the word
“awareness.” Its function is to provide another way to show that
public officials “have awareness” of activity amounting to torture,
even if their actual knowledge cannot be established. In most cases
involving private torture, however, establishing that officials have
knowledge is not problematic: the authorities are well aware that
violence of the sort the applicant fears—whether it be gender-based
violence, genital cutting, anti-gay attacks, or violent retaliation by
gangs, guerillas or cartels—is widespread and ongoing.61
Once it is shown that officials have the requisite awareness,
the Senate understanding is clear that the test for “acquiescence”
turns on how they respond. If officials “breach [their] legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity,”62 they are
acquiescing. Nothing in the ratification history suggests that a
showing of “willful blindness” is needed to establish that officials
have breached their legal responsibility.

B. The “Willful Acceptance” Standard Emerges
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the tribunal
established by the Attorney General to decide appeals from
immigration judge decisions,63 issued Matter of S-V-,64 its first
59.
Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 14 (testimony by Mark Richard,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., Dep’t of Just.).
60.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9 (“The purpose of this condition is to
make it clear that both actual knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the
definition of the term ‘acquiescence’ in [A]rticle 1.”).
61.
Courts generally agree that “awareness” requires only a showing that
public officials are aware that torture of the sort the applicant fears occurs; there
is no need to show that an official is aware of the CAT applicant’s specific
situation. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
62.
Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d), 136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (incorporating the Senate understanding).
63.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Attorney
General to issue regulations and make “controlling” rulings “with respect to all
questions of law” arising under immigration statutes. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (g).
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precedential opinion construing the CAT, in May 2000, about a year
after the CAT immigration regulations went into effect.65 The case
reviewed a motion to reopen a removal order submitted by a man who
contended that if removed to Colombia he would be kidnapped by
guerillas and held in inhuman conditions amounting to torture.66 The
BIA began its analysis by quoting the U.S. definition of
“acquiescence,” and noting that its drafting history indicates that
either actual knowledge or willful blindness can suffice to establish
officials’ “awareness” of torturous activity.67 It then stressed that
“[t]he Senate’s inclusion of this definition of acquiescence in its
understandings” modified the legal effect of the treaty with regard to
The Attorney General has delegated to the BIA the authority to issue legal rulings
in appeals from immigration judge decisions and has authorized the BIA to
designate selected decisions as precedents binding on immigration judges
nationwide. The Attorney General, however, may review and modify or overrule
any decision of the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (d)(3)(ii), (g), (h). Under
administrative law principles, courts generally accord deference to precedential
decisions of the BIA and Attorney General interpreting ambiguous provisions in
the statutes they administer, provided those interpretations are reasonable. See
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (holding that the BIA’s
interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the asylum statute was entitled to
judicial deference); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (establishing the level of deference afforded to
administrative interpretations of statutes, widely known as ‘Chevron deference’).
64.
22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (B.I.A. 2000) (en banc).
65.
Although the treaty took effect for the U.S. in November 1994, the BIA
had found that the immigration courts lacked jurisdiction to award CAT relief
until legislation implementing it in immigration proceedings was enacted. Matter
of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 257–60 (B.I.A. 1998). To avoid violating the treaty
during this period, the INS (which functioned as prosecutor in removal cases) had
adopted a “pre-regulatory administrative process” under which, after the
completion of removal proceedings but prior to executing an order of removal, the
agency would consider whether removing the person to a particular country would
violate Article 3 of the CAT and refrain from removing the person if it concluded
that was the case. See CAT Regulations, supra note 50, at 8479.
66.
Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1307. The respondent also raised a
claim for withholding of removal, which the BIA rejected, finding he was
disqualified by a robbery conviction that triggered the “particularly serious crime”
bar to withholding, and also because he had not shown that he was likely to be
harmed in Colombia on account of his political opinion, social group membership,
or any other protected ground. Id. at 1308–10.
67.
Id. at 1312. The BIA also drew a link between the Senate’s
acquiescence understanding and statements in the ratification history that “only
acts that occur in the context of governmental authority” fall within the CAT’s
definition of torture. Id. The BIA appeared to accept that such a context is present
if the requirements of the Senate understanding are met.
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acquiescence, limiting it to the confines of that definition.68 But then,
inexplicably, rather than looking to the Senate’s definition, the BIA
proceeded to ignore it. Instead, relying on one dictionary definition, it
found that acquiescence means “silent or passive assent.”69 From this
it inferred that the respondent was required to “demonstrate that
Colombian officials are willfully accepting of the guerillas’ torturous
activities.”70
The BIA claimed to find support for this approach in the U.N.
Committee Against Torture’s interpretation of the CAT, citing its
1998 ruling in the case of a Peruvian national who objected to being
deported from Sweden because she feared torture from both the
Peruvian government and Sendero Luminoso, a terrorist group.71 The
Committee noted that Article 3 does not prohibit expelling a person
who would face torture “inflicted by a non-governmental entity,
without the consent or acquiescence of the Government.”72 This
actually afforded no support for the BIA’s interpretation of
acquiescence, because the Committee’s rationale for rejecting the
claim was that the complainant had not established a “real and
personal risk” of being tortured, and it never addressed whether the
facts established “acquiescence” or what that term means.73
68.
Id. This was a puzzling statement, given that there is nothing in the
U.S. “acquiescence” definition to suggest it is more restrictive than the meaning of
the word as used in the treaty; if anything, it might be broader, as one of the
dissenting BIA members pointed out. Id. at 1318 (Rosenberg, dissenting). The
BIA’s understanding of “understandings” was also off-base; an understanding, as
opposed to a reservation, is viewed by the United States as consistent with, not
modifying, its treaty obligations. See Stewart, supra note 43, at 451–52 n.8.
69.
Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1312 (citing THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL
DICTIONARY 17 (3d ed. 1955)).
70.
Id. Interpreting the term otherwise, the BIA added, “would be to
misconstrue the meaning of ‘acquiescence.’” Id.
71.
Id. at 1312–13 (citing G.R.B. v. Sweden, No. 83/1997, Committee
Against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (1998)). In another section of its
opinion the BIA also looked to the Committee’s jurisprudence when addressing
evidentiary standards for proving a person is in danger of torture. Id. at 1313.
72.
G.R.B., ¶ 6.5.
73.
Id. ¶ 6.6. Sweden, in its submission to the Committee, argued that the
complainant had not established a real risk of facing torture from Sendero
Luminoso because any such risk would be “of local character and the
[complainant] could therefore secure her safety by moving within the country.” Id.
¶¶ 4.14–15. See Robert McCorquodale & Rebecca LaForgia, Taking Off the
Blindfolds: Torture by Non-State Actors, 1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 209–10 (2001)
(discussing G.R.B. and explaining that the Committee did not address whether
State acquiescence had been shown).
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The BIA contrasted its newly minted “willful acceptance”
standard with the standard applied in asylum cases, where it is
enough to demonstrate that the government is “unable to control”
nongovernmental persecutors.74 The acquiescence standard, it
emphasized, requires the applicant to “do more than show that the
officials are aware of the activity constituting torture but are
powerless to stop it.”75 The BIA concluded that the record showed the
Colombian government “actively, although to date unsuccessfully,
combats the guerillas” and thus failed to establish that the
government’s “failure to protect its citizens is the result of deliberate
acceptance of the guerillas’ activities.”76
Two years after Matter of S-V-, Attorney General John
Ashcroft issued a precedential opinion reaffirming “willful
acceptance” as the test for acquiescence. The decision, Matter of
Y-L-,77 was primarily aimed at overruling BIA precedents that found
low-level drug offenders eligible for withholding of removal. After
laying out a new standard ensuring that virtually all drug
convictions, regardless of sentence, would trigger the “particularly
serious crime” bar to withholding,78 the remaining issue was whether
the three respondents, who feared violent retaliation from Haitian
death squads and Jamaican and Dominican drug trafficking groups,
qualified for CAT deferral of removal.79 In finding that none of them
had shown that the harm they feared would occur with government
acquiescence, the Attorney General explicitly endorsed Matter of
S-V-’s holding, characterizing its “willful acceptance” test as requiring
a showing of “government-sanctioned atrocities” that occur with the
74.
Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1312–13.
75.
Id. at 1312.
76.
Id. at 1313. Four BIA members took issue with the majority’s approach
in dissenting or concurring opinions. Two opinions argued that because the
guerillas exercised political power and controlled territory, they might themselves
qualify as “public official[s] or other persons acting in an official capacity” within
the meaning of article 1 of the CAT. They pointed to a recent decision of the U.N.
Committee Against Torture finding that warring factions in Somalia were de facto
state actors for purposes of the torture definition. Id. at 1314–15 (Villageliu,
concurring), 1316–17 (Schmidt, concurring and dissenting) (citing Elmi v.
Australia,
No.
120/1998,
Committee
Against
Torture,
U.N.
Doc.
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999)). Another dissenter pointed to “willful blindness” as
a possible way to show that state officials acquiesce to torture even if they oppose
it. Id. at 1318 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
77.
Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280 (A.G. 2002).
78.
Id. at 273–78.
79.
Id. at 279–85.
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“tacit support” or “consent or approval” of authoritative government
officials.80
The willful acceptance standard has two glaring logical flaws.
The first is that it disregards the specific definition of acquiescence in
the U.S. ratification understanding, which indicates that
acquiescence exists if officials have actual or constructive knowledge
of torturous conduct and thereafter breach a legal responsibility to
intervene to prevent it. The mental stance of officials towards the
torture—whether they approve, support, or accept it—has no intrinsic
bearing on those questions. What really needed explication was the
definition’s “legal responsibility” language: where does that legal duty
come from, and what is its scope? The BIA and Attorney General
evaded those key questions by reading “acquiescence” to conform to a
dictionary definition rather than the definition laid out in the Senate
understanding and U.S. regulation. As a matter of statutory
construction, it is axiomatic that when a law expressly defines a term,
the statutory definition takes precedence over the word’s “ordinary
meaning.”81
A second problem is that even under an ordinary meaning
approach, the word “acquiescence” has common meanings extending
well beyond the BIA’s “silent or passive assent” definition.82
Acquiescence also means to reluctantly give in to something, even if
one opposes it.83 In this sense, officials who fail to do what is legally
80.
See id. at 280, 283, 285.
81.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 74–75 (2016); see also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 225–33 (2012) (discussing the interpretive canon that a specific definition
provided by the legislature takes precedence over dictionary definitions of a term).
Although the acquiescence definition is contained in an agency regulation, it has
the force of a statute. Congress, in FARRA, mandated that the agency adopt
implementing regulations for the CAT that included the understandings and
other conditions set out in the Senate’s resolution of ratification. See supra note
49 and accompanying text; see also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress clearly intended that agency regulations would
apply the Senate acquiescence understanding).
82.
Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000).
83.
Dictionary definitions of acquiescence include: “passive assent because
of inability or unwillingness to oppose: I acquiesced in their decision despite my
misgivings.” Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1195 n.8 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)), and “[t]he quality or
condition of accepting or complying with something passively or reluctantly;”
Acquiescence definition 2.b, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/
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required of them to prevent and suppress acts of torture can be said
to acquiesce to that conduct.84 Moreover, as Patricia Freshwater
noted in an astute early commentary on the U.S. acquiescence
standard, the CAT’s torture definition refers to the “consent or
acquiescence” of a public official. Acquiescence therefore must be
meant to cover something beyond what is conveyed by the word
“consent.” The BIA’s standard for acquiescence, however, merely
describes ways in which officials may consent to acts of torture,
rendering the word “acquiescence” redundant.85
The problems with the BIA’s standard had nothing to do with
the concept of willful blindness. The BIA understood that “awareness”
included willful blindness as well as actual knowledge. It was setting
out a test for acquiescence as a whole, for which, under the Senate
understanding, “awareness” is only the first step. Where the BIA
went astray was in disregarding the “breach [of] legal responsibility”
language in the Senate understanding and conflating acquiescence
with consent.
But as federal appeals courts began to review the agency’s
approach, “willful blindness” took center stage.

view/Entry/1718?redirectedFrom=acquiescence#eid
[https://perma.cc/Y68AUU7K].
84.
See C.W. WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR
PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT 446 (2009) (reviewing dictionary definitions of
“acquiescence” and concluding that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word implies
the indirect involvement of the State in the act of torture, most likely in the form
of an omission,” and therefore “when the State refrains from acting where it
should have acted, it can be held responsible”).
85.
Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the
Torture of its Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 597–98 (2005); see also William
Paul Simmons, Liability of Secondary Actors Under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding
and Abetting and Acquiescence to Torture in the Context of the Femicides of
Ciudad Juarez, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 88, 124 (2007) (observing that the
inclusion of both “consent” and “acquiescence” shows that the terms were not
meant to be synonymous). The State Department’s Legal Advisor, testifying
before the Senate in support of ratification, likewise indicated that acquiescence
covers more than official support by referring to torture that occurs “with the
support or acquiescence of government officials.” Senate Hearing, supra note 45,
at 4, 7 (testimony and prepared statement of Abraham Sofaer).
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C. “Willful Blindness” Takes Over
The Ninth Circuit’s 2003 decision in Zheng v. Ashcroft86 was
the first and most influential in a series of federal appeals court
decisions rejecting the “willful acceptance” test.87 Zheng was
smuggled into the United States by members of a Chinese criminal
syndicate called “snakeheads.” He testified against his smugglers in a
criminal proceeding and as a result feared that the organization
would torture and kill him if he returned to China.88 In his
immigration proceedings, Zheng presented evidence that local
officials in his province were connected to the smugglers and accepted
bribes from them, and thus were unlikely to offer him any
protection.89 An immigration judge granted relief under the CAT,90
but the BIA reversed. Relying on Matter of S-V-, the BIA ruled that
the evidence, even if it showed that Chinese officials knew about and
did not interfere with the snakeheads’ smuggling operations, failed to
establish that officials willfully accepted their torturous activities.91
The Ninth Circuit opinion reviewed the drafting history of the
Senate acquiescence understanding, emphasizing that “knowledge”
was replaced with “awareness” to clarify that both actual knowledge
and willful blindness are covered.92 From this it reasoned that the
BIA, in adding a requirement that officials willfully accept torture,
contravened Congress’s clear intent.93 Finding nothing in the
ratification understandings “to suggest that anything more than
awareness is required,” the court concluded that “[t]he correct inquiry
as intended by the Senate is whether a respondent can show that
public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture of their
86.
332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
87.
An earlier decision by the Fifth Circuit had stated that “willful
blindness” was sufficient to prove acquiescence and upheld a denial of CAT relief
because the applicant had not shown that officials “would turn a blind eye” to the
torture he feared, but the court in that case saw no conflict with the BIA’s “willful
acceptance” standard and cited Matter of S-V- approvingly. Ontunez-Tursios v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2002).
88.
Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1190.
89.
Id. at 1188–91. There was also evidence that the Chinese government
refused to acknowledge the snakeheads’ existence and would be unlikely to
intercede because doing so would amount to an admission that they pose a
problem. Id. at 1189 n.5.
90.
Id. at 1192.
91.
Id. at 1191–92.
92.
Id. at 1192–93.
93.
Id. at 1194–96.
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citizens by third parties, or . . . would ‘turn a blind eye to torture.’’94
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to determine
whether Zheng’s evidence established acquiescence under the willful
blindness test.95
The Ninth Circuit was right to reject the BIA’s “willful
acceptance” test as impermissibly restrictive. But there is a blind spot
in Zheng’s reasoning that, ironically, mirrored a central flaw of the
BIA’s approach by ignoring half of the Senate’s definition of
acquiescence. Early in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
acquiescence regulation requires that an official “have awareness” of
torturous activity and then breach a legal responsibility to intervene
to prevent it.96 But the rest of the opinion lost sight of the second part
of that test entirely, stating repeatedly that awareness in the form of
willful blindness is all that is required to establish acquiescence.97
It may be that the Ninth Circuit took the view that officials
who turn a blind eye to torture not only “have awareness” but are also
necessarily breaching a legal responsibility to take preventive action,
without excluding the possibility that an inadequate (although not
willfully blind) response could also constitute a breach of legal duty.
But the court offered no explanation along these lines. In declaring
that the “correct inquiry” for acquiescence is whether public officials
turn a blind eye to torturous conduct,98 Zheng suggested that willful
blindness is not merely another way to establish the “awareness”
element, but the test for acquiescence as a whole—and thus necessary
in order to establish a breach of legal responsibility.
A year after Zheng, the Second Circuit, in Khouzam v.
Ashcroft,99 joined the Ninth Circuit in rejecting the agency’s “willful
acceptance” standard. The Second Circuit fixated less on “willful
blindness” and avoided suggesting that it is a stand-alone test for
acquiescence. Instead, echoing the Senate understanding, the court
held that “[i]n terms of state action, torture requires only that
government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an act and

94.
Id. at 1196 (quoting Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355
(5th Cir. 2002)).
95.
Id. at 1197.
96.
Id. at 1194 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)).
97.
Id. at 1189, 1194, 1196.
98.
Id. at 1196; see also id. at 1194–95 (citing Ontunez-Tursios, at 354-55).
99.
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004).
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thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.”100 The BIA
and Attorney General, the Second Circuit found, erred in creating an
additional requirement of “consent or approval.”101 It noted that such
a requirement would have been consistent with the original Swedish
draft of the CAT, which applied only to torture “by or at the
instigation of” state officials, but the addition of the word
“acquiescence” to the torture definition—a change made at the behest
of the U.S. during the treaty negotiations—showed that official assent
is not needed.102
Applying the Senate understanding’s two-part test, the
Second Circuit held that the record compelled an acquiescence
finding. The BIA had conceded that Khouzam, who was suspected of a
murder in Egypt, would face extreme physical abuse in police
custody, but deemed it not to be torture because it would be inflicted
by rogue officers acting in a “private” capacity, without the approval
of Egyptian officials. The Second Circuit found that even if the police
officers could be said to be acting in a non-official capacity (which the
court doubted), the evidence established that Egyptian police
routinely tortured suspects to extract confessions, which “suppl[ied]
ample evidence that higher-level officials either know of the torture
or remain willfully blind to the torture and breach their legal
responsibility to prevent it.”103 The Khouzam court did not comment
on the source or scope of that legal responsibility, presumably finding
it obvious that law enforcement officials have some sort of legal
obligation not to allow their subordinates to engage in torture.
A third extensively reasoned opinion rejecting the agency
standard was issued by the Third Circuit in 2007. Silva-Rengifo v.
Attorney General104 involved a CAT claim by a long-term U.S. resident
facing removal for a drug conviction who alleged he would be tortured
by criminal groups in Colombia. The Third Circuit recounted at
length the analyses of the Ninth and Second Circuits and expressly
agreed with Zheng’s conclusion that “willful blindness” is the correct
legal standard for acquiescence.105 It remanded the case to the agency

100.
Id. at 170–71.
101.
Id. at 171.
102.
Id. (citing BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119).
103.
Id. at 171.
104.
473 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 2007).
105.
Id. at 65–67, 69–70. Like the Ninth Circuit in Zheng, the Third Circuit
barely mentioned the breach of legal responsibility language in the Senate
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to consider whether country evidence indicating that the Colombian
government fails to prosecute groups committing abuses and has a
collusive relationship with some of those groups sufficed to show that
officials there “turn a blind eye” to torturous conduct.106
Nearly all the other federal appeals courts have agreed with
these three decisions, rejecting the “willful acceptance” test and
endorsing “willful blindness” as the proper standard.107 The BIA
appears to have thrown in the towel. While it has never expressly
overruled Matter of S-V-, the BIA stated in a 2017 precedential
decision that acquiescence “include[s] the concept of willful
blindness.”108

D. The Incoherence of “Willful Blindness” as a Test for
Acquiescence
The judicial focus on “willful blindness” as the central
consideration in determining acquiescence has led to considerable
confusion in the case law about what the concept means, what it
takes to establish willfully blindness, and when, if ever, officials’
inability to prevent acts of torture can amount to willful blindness. At
the same time, the courts’ fixation on willful blindness has led them
to all but ignore the breach of legal responsibility element, developing

understanding and agency regulation, and appeared to assume that “willful
blindness” is what it takes to satisfy both parts of the regulatory test.
106.
Id. at 69–70.
107.
See Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017);
Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2013); Hakim v.
Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 155–57 (5th Cir. 2010); Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927
(6th Cir. 2006); Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005).
The Seventh Circuit has used language suggesting that it applies a “willful
blindness” standard. See Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1182, 1185 (7th
Cir. 2015) (stating that a CAT applicant targeted by a Mexican drug cartel
appears to have a strong case given evidence that he would face “torture . . . to
which local public officials are willfully blind.”). The First and Eleventh Circuits,
without reaching the issue, have noted other Circuits’ disapproval of the willful
acceptance standard. See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 19 n.6 (1st Cir.
2012); Reyes-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
108.
Matter of J-G-D-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 82, 90 (B.I.A. 2017); see also
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 226 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Zheng as “defining
acquiescence as willful blindness”); Matter of G-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 98 (B.I.A.
2013) (stating the applicant failed to show that “the Ghanaian government would
acquiesce in or turn a blind eye to torture”).
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no doctrine aimed at explicating where that legal responsibility comes
from or what it requires.
Most decisions endorsing a willful blindness test either state
or assume that a showing of willful blindness is sufficient to establish
acquiescence. Arguably, this has some support in legislative history.
The Senate report on the CAT stated that the acquiescence
understanding was meant “to make it clear that both actual
knowledge and ‘willful blindness’ fall within the definition of the term
‘acquiescence’ in article 1.”109 One might read that to mean that
willful blindness satisfies both elements of the definition: awareness
and breach of legal responsibility. But more likely, given the Bush
Administration’s explanation that it changed “knowledge” to
“awareness” to make clear that the term includes willful blindness,
the Senate Committee simply meant that willful blindness falls
within the definition because it satisfies the “awareness”
component.110 As Parts II and III will show, officials willfully blind to
torture should be viewed as breaching their legal responsibility under
the CAT and other international law to take diligent preventive
measures. But the U.S. CAT case law has thus far failed to explain
why willful blindness violates a legal duty.
More troublingly, courts have generally treated willful
blindness as not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary
condition for acquiescence. Opinions routinely characterize willful
blindness as the test for acquiescence as a whole.111 Even after
reciting the two-part regulatory definition, decisions go on to state, or
assume in their reasoning, that officials do not breach their legal
responsibility unless they willfully ignore torturous conduct.112
109.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9; see also Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d
333, 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (alluding to that legislative history and then stating that
acquiescence “can be found when government officials remain willfully blind to
torturous conduct and thereby breach their legal responsibility to prevent it”).
110.
See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
111.
See, e.g., Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating
that “official acquiescence . . . exists when government officials were aware of the
torture but remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir.
2009))); Roye, 693 F.3d at 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that willful blindness is “the
minimum mens rea requirement pertaining to those who consent to or acquiesce
in acts of torture committed by others”).
112.
See, e.g., Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting the acquiescence regulation, then restating it as, “[i]n colloquial
terms, . . . [i]s the official willfully blind?” and instructing the BIA to apply the
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As a legal concept, willful blindness has its origins in criminal
law, where it developed as a justification for finding defendants guilty
of offenses that require “knowing” conduct in situations where the
person consciously avoided finding out key facts that would render
them culpable (for example, taking money from a known drug dealer
to drive a car with something hidden in the trunk, without ever
asking what the trunk contains).113 The Supreme Court has described
it as a state of mind that “surpasses recklessness and negligence” and
requires “deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of
wrongdoing.”114
When willful blindness, designed to serve as a highculpability form of constructive knowledge, is used in CAT cases not
only to establish “awareness” (a purpose for which it is well-suited),
but also to define the scope of officials’ legal responsibility to take
preventive action (a purpose to which it bears no logical relation), the
results are predictable. Any response that amounts to more than
“turning a blind eye”—in other words, officials taking any steps at all
to protect the victims or pursue the perpetrators—can easily be
characterized as something better than willful blindness. When
willful blindness test to determine whether the response to torture amounted to
acquiescence); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
the acquiescence regulation, then stating: “A government . . . cross[es] the line
into acquiescence when it shows ‘willful blindness toward the torture of citizens
by third parties.’” (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir.
2005))); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2002)
(quoting the regulation, then upholding BIA’s finding of no acquiescence because
the evidence failed to show Honduran officials “would turn a blind eye to torture”).
113.
These were the facts in a seminal criminal “willful blindness” decision,
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See also Barry
Gross & Stephen G. Stroup, Has the Legal Threshold for ‘Willful Blindness’ Really
Changed Since Global-Tech?, 83 U.S.L.W. 1202, 1203 (2015) (discussing
development of the concept in criminal case law).
114.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011); see
also Roye, 693 F.3d at 343 n.13 (quoting Global-Tech to explain what “willful
blindness” means for purposes of CAT acquiescence). Regulations issued in the
waning days of the Trump Administration added to the CAT acquiescence
regulation a statement that “awareness” includes both actual knowledge and
willful blindness and a definition of “willful blindness” drawn from Global-Tech.
Final Rule, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear
and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, at 80,369, 80,398 (Dec. 11,
2020) [hereinafter December 2020 Final Rule] (discussing and setting forth text of
amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7)); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, at 36,287 (June 15, 2020) [hereinafter June 2020 Proposed
Rule] (citing Global-Tech as source of the rule’s definition of willful blindness).

768

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[52.2

governments take woefully inadequate, inept, or half-hearted
measures to address known torturous activity, one could fairly call
their response negligent or reckless, but it is hard to label it “willful
blindness.”
As an example, take Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, a 2017 Eighth
Circuit decision.115 The CAT applicant in that case was a woman from
Honduras who suffered prolonged and severe physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse from a domestic partner who she feared would
kill her upon her return. The court noted that evidence in the record
showed “domestic violence is a widespread problem in
Honduras, . . . impunity for persecutors is common, and . . . the laws
and institutions in place to assist victims are largely ineffectual,” and
observed, “[i]t is evident that the Honduran government has fallen
short in providing the necessary resources to address the issue.”116
Nonetheless, applying the willful blindness test, the court upheld the
BIA’s finding of no acquiescence, concluding that this evidence did not
compel a conclusion that the “government generally consents or
acquiesces in domestic violence.”117
Many cases involving applicants who fear torture from gangs
or other non-State groups deploy similar reasoning. In one decision, a
woman beaten and threatened by the M-18 gang in El Salvador was
found not to have established acquiescence despite evidence of police
corruption and the fact that an M-18 leader was able to call her from
prison and offer to protect her from the gang if she visited and had
sex with him at the prison, because “the record also show[ed] that El
Salvador has taken steps to abate gang violence.”118 Another court
115.
848 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2017).
116.
Id. at 854.
117.
Id. at 852, 854. The court also noted that the applicant never reported
her abuse to the police and thus “never gave the government the opportunity to
protect her” from the torturous conduct. Id. at 852. However, it appeared to accept
that this was not fatal to a finding of acquiescence, but could be overcome if the
evidence showed the government’s overall response to domestic violence was
willfully blind. Id. at 854.
118.
De Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 537, 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2018); see also
Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1029–30, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (in
which a Guatemalan woman, after being beaten and raped by masked men, was
told police would not investigate unless she identified the assailants; the court
upheld a finding of no-acquiescence because Guatemala took “steps to combat
violence against women,” despite evidence that its efforts were weak and
ineffective); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 609–12 (3d Cir.
2011) (upholding a BIA no-acquiescence finding because media reports showed
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upheld the BIA’s no-acquiescence finding in the case of a defector
from a gang who was beaten and threatened when he refused to
engage in acts of violence. It concluded that “widespread evidence of
corruption” in the government and police, and the fact that when one
beating was reported the police took no action beyond filing a report,
were insufficient to show acquiescence because there was also
evidence that the Salvadoran government “is attempting to take steps
and actions to deal with police corruption” and “is accepting the
United States’ assistance in combating the country’s gang
enterprises.”119 Other cases find that as long as the police took any
action when torturous activity or threats were reported to them—
even if it was just gathering some evidence or temporarily increasing
patrols in the victim’s neighborhood—that is enough to negate willful
blindness and justify a finding of no acquiescence.120
Even the Second Circuit, the only Court of Appeals to
consistently stress that awareness and breach of legal responsibility
are distinct elements, has failed to offer a theory of what the second
part of the acquiescence definition means. The Second Circuit has
repeatedly stated that acquiescence can be shown by “evidence that
that the Honduran government “seeks to combat the [gang] problem and protect
its citizens,” despite applicant’s testimony that the five times he reported threats
and violence to Honduran police they claimed they were investigating but there
were no observable results).
119.
Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 495–97, 501–02 (6th Cir.
2015); see also Medina-Velasquez v. Sessions, 680 Fed. App’x 744, 746–47, 753–54
(10th Cir. 2017) (upholding a BIA no-acquiescence finding despite a country
expert’s testimony that the Honduran government fails to protect its citizens from
gangs due to “lack of resources, corruption, and intimidation of prosecutors and
judges,” because the expert conceded that Honduras “makes some attempt” to
police gangs by imprisoning gang members).
120.
See Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 575, 579–80 (8th Cir.
2009) (affirming a no-acquiescence finding because when a Guatemalan woman
reported death threats from the MS the police sent extra patrols to her
neighborhood for a time, even though they took no further action and there was
“evidence of general police reluctance to pursue gang members”); Reyes-Sanchez
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1241–43 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the denial
of a CAT claim because the evidence did not show police “did nothing” after a
Peruvian man reported violent threats from a rebel group, although all they did
was come to the scene and gather evidence); Otunez-Turcios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
341, 345–47, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding a no-acquiescence finding in a case
where Guatemalan police escorted landlords to a meeting where a campesino
opposing the landlords was killed and the police later arrested the shooter but
failed to take any action against the landlords, who were implicated by the
shooter when he confessed).

770

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[52.2

officials knew of private parties’ abusive actions and thereafter
breached their legal responsibility to prevent such actions.”121 This at
least opens up the possibility that acquiescence may exist where
officials who know about torturous activity respond in a manner that
is legally inadequate, even if not “willfully blind.” In Delgado v.
Mukasey, the Second Circuit vacated the BIA’s denial of a CAT claim
and remanded the case to the agency to consider whether the
acquiescence standard was satisfied by evidence showing that local
officials did little in response to a complaint the petitioner filed after
she was kidnapped and threatened by FARC guerillas, and that
Colombia’s government, to promote peace talks, had allowed the
FARC to maintain control over a “Switzerland-sized area” of the
country.122 But the court provided no guidance on how to determine
whether those circumstances would amount to a legal breach, and if
so, why.
When, if ever, a government’s inability to prevent acts of
torture by non-State actors can constitute “willful blindness” has also
been a source of confusion in the case law.123 Courts routinely state
that acquiescence requires more than a showing that officials are
“unable or unwilling” to provide protection, the standard applicable to
121.
Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and emendations omitted) (partially quoting Khouzam v.
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also De La Rosa v. Holder, 598
F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (characterizing the standard for acquiescence
similarly).
122.
Delgado, 508 F.3d at 709; see also Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 335
(2d Cir. 2020) (remanding a CAT claim because the BIA failed to address the
“legal responsibility” aspect of the acquiescence definition, and directing the
agency to consider “what ‘legal responsibility’ Jamaican officials had to protect a
serving police officer threatened with gang violence”). In one of the few decisions
of other circuits to give distinct attention to the breach-of-legal-responsibility
element, an Eighth Circuit panel instructed the BIA to address whether law
enforcement officials who would not intervene to stop torture by rogue officers
working for a drug cartel would be breaching their legal responsibility by failing
to make arrests. Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 908 (8th Cir. 2009).
123.
See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES §
7:33 (2020) (“U.S. courts have not established a clear rule for determining
whether a government’s inability to stop torturous acts by a non-state actor
manifests . . . its acquiescence”); James Feroli, Developments Under the
Convention Against Torture, 19-03 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (discussing the
conflicting case law); Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 335–36 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting
uncertainty in the case law and remanding to the BIA to address how, if at all,
authorities’ inability to fulfill their legal obligations of protection should inform
the acquiescence determination).
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asylum and withholding of removal claims.124 The willful blindness
inquiry, as one court put it, “centers upon the willfulness of a
government’s non-intervention.”125 Thus, the decisions generally
agree that an official’s unwillingness to take any protective action
will constitute acquiescence.
Some courts have opened the door to considering a
government’s inability to control private actors’ torturous conduct by
reasoning that the CAT’s definition of torture requires only a showing
that “a public official”126 —not the government generally—will likely
acquiesce (or collude or participate in) the feared acts of torture. A
much-cited Ninth Circuit case, Tapia Madrigal v. Holder,127 vacated a
BIA ruling which denied CAT relief to a former member of the
Mexican military who feared violent retaliation from the Los Zetas
drug cartel. The Ninth Circuit found that the BIA erred by focusing
on the Mexican government’s efforts to fight the Zetas as reason to
conclude there would be no State acquiescence. Instead, the relevant
question, based on evidence showing local police officers and prison
officials frequently work for the cartels, was whether it was likely
that the applicant, if he sought official help, would encounter at least
one official who would turn a blind eye to the Zetas’ torturous
activity. If so, the court reasoned, the Mexican government’s ability to
control Los Zetas becomes highly relevant, because he is likely to face
torture, with a public official’s acquiescence, unless the efforts of
other government actors are efficacious enough to actually protect
him from the Zetas’ violence.128 The Second, Third, and Seventh

124.
See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 611 (3d Cir.
2011) (stating the “unable or unwilling” asylum standard “is not applicable to a
claim for relief under the CAT”); Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely
because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it, but does cross the line into
acquiescence when it shows willful blindness toward the torture of its citizens by
third parties.”); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that acquiescence requires more than a showing “that public officials would be
merely unable or unwilling to prevent torture by private parties”).
125.
Mouawad, 485 F.3d at 413.
126.
Both the treaty’s torture definition and its implementing U.S.
regulation use the singular: “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” CAT art. 1(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
127.
716 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2013).
128.
Id. at 509–10.
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Circuits have issued opinions with similar reasoning,129 and several
other circuits have endorsed the idea that it is enough to show that a
low-level official will likely acquiesce or participate in the feared
torture, even if other government actors actively oppose the torturous
activity.130
Although these cases have been celebrated by some advocates
as providing a roadmap to winning CAT protection for persons fleeing
gang and cartel violence,131 their effect has been limited by the
reluctance of many courts to infer from evidence of widespread official
corruption that a particular CAT applicant is likely to be ignored or
mistreated by the authorities when reporting a threat or incident.132
129.
See De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where a
government contains officials that would be complicit in torture, and the
government . . . is admittedly incapable of actually preventing that torture, the
fact that some officials take action to prevent the torture would [not seem to be]
inconsistent with a finding of government acquiescence . . . .”); RodriguezMolinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–40 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that it was
enough to show that corrupt local officers had colluded with the Zetas in torturing
him, and that preventive efforts by other government actors were irrelevant
unless “the Mexican government could be expected to [actually] protect the
petitioner from the Zetas should he be returned to Mexico”). Similar reasoning
appears to underlie, at least in part, statements by the Third Circuit that a
government’s inability to control groups engaged in torture, while not dispositive,
may in some circumstances be relevant to establishing acquiescence through
willful blindness. See Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 788, 792–93 (3d Cir.
2019); Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 2011).
130.
For examples of cases where courts have acknowledged that
participation, collusion, or acquiescence in torture by low-level police officers is
sufficient, see Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2019); IreguasValdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 812–13 (5th Cir. 2017); Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder,
574 F.3d 893, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2009).
131.
Several articles have hailed this line of cases as portending a more
generous application of the CAT to individuals fleeing gang or cartel violence. See
Feroli, supra note 123, at 5; Schulman, supra note 16, at 299; Benjamin H.
Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening the Floodgates?: Refugee Law and Its
Application to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135,
162–64 (2012).
132.
See, e.g., Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 497, 501–02 (6th
Cir. 2015) (upholding BIA decision that evidence of widespread corruption
throughout the Salvadoran government was insufficient to prove that a public
official is likely to acquiesce to any future harm the applicant may face from
gangs); see also supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text (discussing other
case examples); ANKER, supra note 123, § 7:33 n.24 (listing Court of Appeals
decisions which suggest that “proof of widespread corruption within government
is not sufficient by itself to meet the acquiescence requirement”); Matter of G-K-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 88, 98 (B.I.A. 2013) (upholding an immigration judge’s decision
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If the person cannot point to past efforts to enlist official help that
were met with willful blindness, or never went to the police because
they believed it would do no good, the BIA and some reviewing courts
seem particularly reluctant to conclude that there is a probability
that officials will acquiesce to their torture.133 But other appellate
panels have overturned BIA decisions for giving insufficient attention
to evidence of a widespread pattern of corrupt collusion with criminal
organizations or a general failure to enforce laws that protect at-risk
groups from harm.134
Another possible path to finding willful blindness in
situations where a government, even if willing, lacks the ability to
protect its citizens can be found in a few federal appeals court
decisions holding that, to show acquiescence, “[i]t is enough that
public officials remained willfully blind to [torturous conduct], or
simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose

that “generalized evidence of government corruption” was insufficient to show a
government would acquiescence to torture).
133.
See Matter of O-F-A-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 709, 720 (B.I.A. 2019), vacated
on other grounds, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35, 42 (A.G. 2020) (rejecting a CAT acquiescence
claim because the applicant did not report the incident to the police and “[i]t is not
sufficient to simply assume that the police would not have responded”); AldanaRamos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding no-acquiescence
finding because police investigated and made an arrest when the applicants’
father was murdered by a Guatemalan gang; evidence that suspects were released
after the judge was bribed did not suffice because “petitioners have made no
showing that similar bribery would likely occur in a future case”). But see Alvarez
Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding the BIA erred by failing
to consider, in the case of a Honduran woman threatened by a gang who did not
seek help from the police, her testimony about why she believed local police
colluded with the gang and other evidence that the police and gang shared
information).
134.
See, e.g., Quiroz Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2018)
(stating that “[e]vidence showing widespread corruption of public officials . . . can
be highly probative” in establishing that an applicant will encounter officials
likely to acquiesce in their torture); Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 657–60 (7th
Cir. 2011) (holding, in the case of a woman who faced an honor killing in Jordan,
that acquiescence was established by a pattern of lenient sentences imposed by
the judiciary for honor killings and the fact that the government offered no
protection for potential victims other than extended protective custody); Bromfield
v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding evidence that Jamaican
police generally fail to investigate attacks on gay men probative of its
acquiescence to anti-gay violence).
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it.”135 The Third Circuit applied this doctrine in the case of a
Colombian woman who, when she reported to the police and the
military that she had been kidnapped and threatened by FARC
guerillas, was told there was nothing they could do to protect her. In
essence, the court reasoned, the authorities indicated that “they
would do nothing to stop” the torturous activities, which could
support a finding of willful blindness—even if their reason for taking
no action was that any steps they might try to take would be futile.136
The Ninth Circuit similarly drew a distinction between officials’
“inability . . . to oppose criminal organizations,” which may suffice to
establish acquiescence, and their “ineffective[ness] in preventing or
investigating criminal activities,” which is insufficient.137 The “unable
to oppose” formulation, which so far has found little traction outside
these two circuits, may help some CAT applicants show acquiescence
in situations where governments have lost control so completely that
officials cannot do anything to counter groups engaging in torture and
do not even try.138 But it leaves intact the willful blindness test for
acquiescence, under which any enforcement efforts made by officials,
no matter how inept, under-resourced, or ill-calculated to address the
problem, will be viewed by most courts as sufficient to show that
officials have not “turned a blind eye.”
135.
Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis
added).
136.
See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350–51 (3d Cir. 2008);
see also Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2011)
(applying the same reasoning to a case involving government inability to control
paramilitary and drug trafficking groups).
137.
Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2014)
(finding acquiescence was not established when Guatemalan police did not pursue
an investigation because the victim could not identify her masked assailants, and
country evidence showed that the Guatemalan government was taking some,
albeit ineffective, steps to combat violence against women).
138.
A December 2020 amendment to the CAT acquiescence regulation—
part of an extensive Trump Administration package of asylum-restricting rules
that may be overturned in court or rescinded under President Biden—adds a
sentence providing that an official will not be deemed to have breached a legal
responsibility to intervene “if such person is unable to intervene, or if the person
intervenes but is unable to prevent the activity that constitutes torture.”
December 2020 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 80,398 (amending 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(7)). The commentary that accompanied the rule when it was
proposed stated that it is meant to “supersede any judicial opinions that could be
read to hold that an official actor could acquiesce to torturous activities [they are]
unable to prevent.” June 2020 Proposed Rule, supra note 114, at 36,288.
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...
For nearly two decades, federal appeals courts have struggled
to define the scope and meaning of official acquiescence under the
CAT. While appropriately rejecting “willful acceptance” as the
standard, the decisions have elevated “willful blindness”—a concept
introduced in the legislative history to describe how officials may be
aware of private actors’ torturous acts even if they lack actual
knowledge—into a stand-alone test for acquiescence. But
acquiescence, under the express terms of the Senate understanding,
is defined by two elements: (1) awareness, followed by (2) a breach of
legal responsibility. Willful blindness is often unnecessary for the
first element, given that officials usually have actual knowledge that
a particular sort of torturous violence is prevalent. And it is ill-suited
as the measure for the second. Neither the treaty’s ratification history
nor logic provides any basis for thinking that the only legal
responsibility that public officials have in relation to torture is not to
be willfully blind to it. When courts invoke willful blindness as the
test for acquiescence, it is hard for them to avoid reaching the
conclusion that any responsive action taken by officials, no matter
how inadequate, shows they are not being willfully blind.139
In order to give real effect to the language of the Senate
understanding, and greater coherence to the case law, courts must
seriously examine issues that willful blindness has thus far obscured.
What legal responsibility do public officials have to intervene to
prevent acts of torture? What is its source, and what are its contours?
The next Part examines international law, where the idea of a legal
obligation of “due diligence” on the part of States to prevent acts of
torture has gained wide acceptance. Part III then explores how that

139.
Some commentators have argued that under the “willful blindness”
test, courts should find that officials acquiesce to domestic violence or other types
of privately inflicted torture in situations where there has been some but
inadequate action taken in response to a reported incident, or the government’s
response to violence of that type is systemically deficient. See Freshwater, supra
note 85, at 598–602; see also Lori A. Nessel, ‘Willful Blindness’ to Gender-Based
Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 143–49 (2004)
(suggesting that States are willfully blind when they fail to take adequate
measures to prevent domestic violence). But it strains the ordinary and legal
meaning of “willful blindness” to read the term that broadly, and, as we have
seen, few courts have done so.
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II. ACQUIESCENCE AND THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT
TORTURE UNDER THE CAT
Given that the U.S., in ratifying the CAT, defined
“acquiescence” by referencing the “legal responsibility” an official has
to intervene to prevent torturous activity, it makes sense to look to
the CAT itself as a source of legal responsibility.140 If the treaty
imposes a legal duty on State officials to respond in certain ways to
acts of torture by non-State actors, a failure to meet those
responsibilities should be considered acquiescence.
A broad consensus has emerged in the jurisprudence of U.N.
treaty bodies and international human rights courts that States have
an obligation to exercise “due diligence” to prevent acts of torture,
whether inflicted by State officials or private parties—a duty to
engage in serious and reasonable preventive and remedial measures
that are proportional to the problem and likely to be effective in
producing results.141 This Part will discuss how the due diligence
approach developed and gained wide acceptance, and why it is
justified as a matter of treaty interpretation.

A. The Due Diligence Obligation to Prevent Torture in
International Law
The CAT was adopted not to outlaw torture, which was
already illegal under international law, but to build a framework for
more effective efforts by States to eradicate it.142 The CAT’s preamble
140.
See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446–47 (observing that although the
U.S. understanding “did not further specify to what legal responsibilities it
referred” both national and international obligations may apply, “in particular the
obligations entailed in the Convention Against Torture”); Rosati, supra note 12, at
1775 (noting that legal duties to intervene to prevent acts of torture provided for
in the CAT can give content to the “legal responsibility” referred to in the Senate
understanding).
141.
See Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. Liebowitz, Due Diligence and Gender
Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301, 304–11,
317–20, 327–29 (2015); see also infra notes 290–98 and accompanying text
(discussing the meaning of due diligence).
142.
See supra note 9; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 1
(emphasizing the CAT did not outlaw torture but is aimed at strengthening its
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specifically invokes Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), “both of which provide that no one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.”143 Nearly identical prohibitions also appeared in two
major regional human rights treaties, the 1953 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms144
and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.145
The due diligence principle emerged as an interpretation of
what those provisions require of States when torture is committed by
non-State actors. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in a 1982
General Comment on ICCPR Article 7, expressed the view that it is
“the duty of public authorities to ensure protection by the law against
such treatment even when committed by persons . . . without any
official authority,” and that this duty required States to effectively
investigate complaints, hold those found guilty responsible, and
provide effective remedies to victims.146 In subsequent general
existing prohibition under international law); CAT, supra note 1, pmbl.
(referencing existing prohibitions and then expressing the States parties’ desire to
“make more effective the struggle against torture . . . throughout the world”).
143.
CAT, supra note 1, pmbl., citing G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 71 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
144.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, 224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
145.
American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, art. 5(2), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 146 (entered into force July
18, 1978) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment . . . .”). The 1981 African Charter on Human Rights
similarly outlaws all torture. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
adopted Jun. 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)
(“All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave
trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be
prohibited.”). International humanitarian law, since the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and even earlier, has proscribed all use of torture in armed conflict.
See Rachel Lord, The Liability of Non-State Actors for Torture in Violation of
International Humanitarian Law, 4 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 112, 121–26, 129–33
(2003).
146.
Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Annex 5 at 94, General comment
7(16), ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (Sep. 22, 1982). Employing similar reasoning in a
1987 ruling on an individual complaint, the Human Rights Committee found
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comments, the Human Rights Committee elaborated on the State’s
obligation to “exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or
redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or
entities.”147
The seminal statement of the principle appeared in the first
decision issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the
1988 Velásquez Rodríguez case,148 which involved the disappearance
in Honduras of a politically active student amid a pattern of
kidnappings, torture, and disappearances of suspected government
opponents. The complaint alleged violations of several provisions of
the American Convention, including Article 5’s prohibition of
torture.149 Although there was strong reason to suspect direct
government involvement, the court’s opinion made it clear that the
State’s responsibility did not depend on this:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which
is initially not directly imputable to a State (for
example, because it is the act of a private person or
because the person responsible has not been
identified) can lead to international responsibility of
the State, not because of the act itself, but because of
the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to
respond to it . . . . The State has a legal duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations
and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a
serious
investigation . . . ,
to
identify
those

Colombia violated article 6 of the ICCPR (right to life) in a case of disappearance
and death because the State failed in its duty to “take specific and effective
measures to prevent” disappearances and failed to conduct a thorough
investigation. Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, No. 161/1983, ¶ 10.3 (Hum. Rts. Comm.
Dec. 1, 1987).
147.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004); see also Human Rights Comm., General
Comment 20: Article 7, ¶¶ 2, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) (discussing the
duty of States parties to “afford everyone protection through legislative and other
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7,” including
acts inflicted by persons acting “in a private capacity”).
148.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988); see also NIGEL S. RODLEY,
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (2d ed. 1999)
(noting that “the Velásquez Rodríguez case has been influential beyond the region
in clarifying the normative status and legal consequences of torture”).
149.
Velásquez Rodríguez, ¶¶ 1–3, 147–48.
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responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.150
Honduras was found liable because its law enforcement officials did
not conduct a “serious investigation” of Velásquez’s disappearance
and its judges failed to act when writs were filed on his behalf.151
The European Court of Human Rights has also long
interpreted the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in
Article 3 of the European Convention as requiring States to take
effective steps to prevent and punish private actors’ abuses.152 It most
fully articulated its due diligence doctrine in Opuz v. Turkey, which
held that Turkish officials violated Article 3 by failing to protect a
woman from severe domestic violence at the hands of her domestic
partner.153 The authorities arrested her partner several times, but
repeatedly released him with little or no punishment, and did little to
150.
Id. ¶¶ 172, 174.
151.
Id. ¶¶ 178–82. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights has also adopted Velásquez Rodríguez’s due diligence approach as its
standard for assessing State responsibility for torture or other rights violations by
private parties. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe,
No. 245/2002, Decision, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ¶¶ 141–
60 (May 2006).
152.
See, e.g., Z & Ors. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, ¶¶ 69–
75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59455 (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (finding State responsible for
parents’ acts of child abuse because Article 3 “requires States to take
measures . . . to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected
to torture,” and those measures should “provide effective protection . . . of children
and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent illtreatment of which the authorities had. . . knowledge”); X & Y v. The Netherlands,
App. No. 8978/80, ¶¶ 7–11, 21–27, 30, 33–34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 26, 1985),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603 (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review) (finding State responsible for sexual assault of a mentally
disabled 16-year old girl at a privately-run group home because it failed to pursue
criminal proceedings and thus breached its duty to provide “effective deterrence”
and “practical and effective protection”). As early as the 1970s, decisions of the
European Commission had declared that States may be held responsible for rights
violations by private actors if they fail to take appropriate measures to counter
them. See Geraldine Van Bueren, Opening Pandora’s Box: Protecting Children
Against Torture or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17
L. & POL’Y 377, 383 (1995) (discussing Commission decisions).
153.
Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶ 176 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9,
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92945 (on file with the Columbia
Human Rights Law Review). The court also found violations of other provisions of
the European Convention, including Article 2’s right to life due to the Turkish
authorities’ failure to protect against the murder of the applicant’s mother.
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protect the victim until his violence finally culminated in the murder
of the woman’s mother.154 The European Court noted that while
national authorities “did not remain totally passive” their response
“was manifestly inadequate to the gravity of the offenses in question”
and failed to meet their duty to take “all reasonable measures to
prevent the recurrence of violent attacks.”155 It cautioned that due
diligence must be interpreted in a way that “does not impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities” and takes
into account the need to respect due process. But, where authorities
know or ought to be aware of violent attacks or threats that place an
individual at immediate risk, officials are obligated to do all that
could reasonably be expected of them to avoid or mitigate that risk.156
The U.N. General Assembly’s 1993 Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women explicitly called on States to
“[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and . . . punish acts of
violence against women,” whether by the State or private persons,
and “[a]dopt all appropriate measures . . . to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct” that foster such violence.157 In 2006, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women issued an
extensive report on the due diligence standard, tracing its origins and
concluding, in light of its broad acceptance by treaty bodies and
human rights tribunals, that it had ripened into “a rule of customary
international law that obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of
violence against women with due diligence.”158
154.
Id. ¶¶ 7–69.
155.
Id. ¶¶ 162–70.
156.
Id. ¶¶ 129–30. The Court also pointed to failures of due diligence at
the systemic level, including a “culture of domestic violence” in Turkey, the
general reluctance of police and prosecutors to intervene, and unwarranted
leniency on the part of courts. Id. ¶¶ 91–99.
157.
G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/104, at art. 4(c), (j) (Dec. 20, 1993). A
1994 regional human rights treaty adopted similar wording, requiring States
parties to “apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for
violence against women” and pursue a range of other preventive and remedial
policies, including taking “all appropriate measures” to modify “legal or customary
practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women.”
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), art. 7 (June 9, 1994).
158.
Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its
Causes and Consequences), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶¶ 19–29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61
(Jan. 20, 2006). The report extensively discusses the preventive, protective,
punitive, and remedial duties States may be held to under the due diligence
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Given the CAT’s stated goal of making the already existing
international law prohibition of torture more effective, a strong case
exists for reading it to impose the same due diligence obligation on
States that is widely accepted under the ICCPR and other
international law instruments. The CAT does differ from other antitorture treaties in that it contains its own, more State-focused
definition of torture.159 It also lacks language that appears in the
ICCPR and regional treaties obligating States to “secure” or “ensure”
the guaranteed rights to all persons in their territory, which courts
and treaty bodies have pointed to as partial justification for a State
duty of due diligence to protect against private violations.160
Those differences, however, need not mean that the CAT
imposes a lesser duty to protect against private acts of torture. The
presence of “acquiescence” in the CAT’s torture definition opens the
door to a due diligence interpretation. Moreover, the CAT’s
substantive Articles impose an array of affirmative duties on States
to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture that fit in
well with a due diligence approach. Article 2 mandates that “[e]ach
State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction.” Subsequent Articles lay out more specific obligations,
standard. Id. ¶¶ 30–55, 74–93; see also Rashida Manjoo, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/23/49 (May 14, 2013) (elaborating further on the due diligence standard).
159.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (limiting the definition of torture to
situations “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity”); see also Andrew Byrnes, The Committee Against Torture, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 509, 509–13,
540 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (discussing the desirability of interpreting the CAT
in a manner consistent with other human rights instruments prohibiting torture,
while at the same time grounding interpretation in the CAT’s particular text,
purpose, and history).
160.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm. Gen. Cmt. No. 31, supra note 147, ¶ 8
(deriving the due diligence duty from both ICCPR Article 7 and Article 2(1)’s
requirement that States “ensure” the guaranteed rights); Opuz v. Turkey, App.
No. 33401/02, ¶ 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009) (relying on both Article 3 of the
European Convention and Article 1’s requirement that States “secure” rights to
all within their jurisdiction); Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4 ¶¶ 166–75 (July 29, 1988) (relying on States’ obligation under
Article 1(1) to “ensure” all rights protected by the American Convention);
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, ¶¶ 142, 164 (2006) (relying
on Article 1 of the African Charter requiring States to “adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect” to the guaranteed rights).
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including requirements that the State criminalize and appropriately
punish acts of torture (Articles 4–9), promptly investigate whenever
there is reasonable ground to believe an act of torture has been
committed (Article 12), ensure that all complaints are promptly and
impartially examined and that complainants and witnesses are
protected against retaliation (Article 13), and ensure that the legal
system provides redress and appropriate compensation to victims
(Article 14).161 A failure by State officials to take effective preventive
measures against private acts of torture in accordance with these
Articles can be regarded as a form of “acquiescence.”
The first report issued by the newly-created office of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1986 noted that, while the CAT did
not cover acts of purely private brutality, the drafters’ decision to add
“consent or acquiescence” to the treaty’s State responsibility language
meant that when officials take a “passive attitude” toward practices
like sexual mutilations, the State’s failure “to ensure protection by
the law against such treatment” can be considered acquiescence.162
Sir Nigel Rodley, the second U.N. Special Rapporteur, addressing
racism and torture in one of his reports, noted that when minority
groups face threat or attack from private citizens, the lack of “due
prevention and diligence” by public officials “further encourages such
private violence” and represents acquiescence.163
161.
CAT, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4–9, 12–14.
162.
P. Kooijmans (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 38, 49, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1986/15 (Feb. 19, 1986). The Special Rapporteur position was created in
1985 under a U.N. resolution that references the CAT and charges the Special
Rapporteur with reporting annually to U.N. bodies on matters pertaining to
torture. See ANKER, supra note 123, § 7:13; see also RODLEY, supra note 148, at
145–50 (discussing the origins and mandate of the office).
163.
Sir Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Civil and Political Rights
Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2001/66
(Jan. 25, 2001). Rodley similarly wrote, in a report issued a few months earlier:
“Under international law, [the “consent or acquiescence”] element of the [torture]
definition makes the State responsible for acts committed by private individuals
which it did not prevent from occurring or, if need be, for which it did not provide
appropriate remedies.” Sir Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/66 (Nov. 14, 2000). The U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights,
in a 2002 report on torture, cited the Special Rapporteur’s view that States are
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By 2001, the U.N. Committee Against Torture, in exercising
its authority to comment on the periodic reports each State party is
required to submit under the CAT,164 regularly expressed concern
about the failure of officials in various countries to adequately protect
against, investigate, prosecute, and appropriately punish attacks
against racial and religious minorities and violence against women.165
Around the same time, the Committee began to draw on the
international jurisprudence of due diligence in ruling on individual
complaints.166 In its 2002 Dzemajl decision, it found that Yugoslav
authorities had acquiesced in a mob attack on a Roma settlement
responsible under the CAT not only for torturous acts committed by officials or
state-supported groups like paramilitaries, but also in situations where the
authorities do not “provide effective protection from ill-treatment (i.e. fail to
prevent or remedy such acts), including ill-treatment by non-State actors.” U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 4 (Rev. 1),
Combating Torture 34 (2002) (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review).
164.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 19.
165.
Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture: Twenty-Fifth Session (13–24
November 2000) Twenty-sixth session (30 Apr.–18 May 2001), GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 44 (A/56/44) (2001), at ¶ 81(d), 82(j) (expressing concern at mob violence
against Jehovah’s Witnesses in Georgia “and the failure of the police to intervene
and take appropriate action,” and recommending that “[e]ffective measures be
taken to prosecute and punish violence against women . . . including adopting
appropriate legislation, . . . raising awareness of the problem [and] including the
issue in the training of law-enforcement officials”), ¶ 104(c), (d) (expressing
concern at the failure of police in Slovakia to provide “adequate protection”
against racially motivated attacks on Roma by extremists and authorities’ failure
to “carry out prompt, impartial and thorough investigations . . . or to prosecute or
punish those responsible”), ¶¶ 113(b), 114(a) (expressing concern to the Czech
Republic about “continuing reports of violent attacks against Roma and the
alleged failure on the part of police and judicial authorities to provide adequate
protection and to investigate and prosecute such crimes, as well as the lenient
treatment of offenders”); see also ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 217–18 (2011) (describing other concluding
observations issued by the Committee on gender violence by private actors).
166.
The Committee is authorized to receive and issue its views on
complaints filed by individuals who allege they have been subjected to a violation
of the CAT by a State party, but only if the State in question has made a
declaration that it recognizes the Committee’s competence to do so. CAT, supra
note 1, art. 22. This is the only CAT mechanism the United States opted not to
join. See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 6, 9. U.S. tribunals have nonetheless
cited and relied on individual decisions issued by the Committee for their
persuasive value as interpretations of the treaty. See Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 291, 303 (B.I.A. 2002); Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312–13 (B.I.A.
2000).
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because they failed to take appropriate steps to protect residents
during the attack and afterwards conducted an inadequate
investigation that failed to bring any of the perpetrators to justice.167
The Committee prefaced its finding of State responsibility with an
extensive discussion of the due diligence standard as developed in the
comments and case law of the Human Rights Committee and the
Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights.168
In May 2002, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board
issued guidance on applying legislation that incorporated the CAT’s
torture definition and non-refoulement requirement.169 The guidelines
expressly linked the concept of “acquiescence” to a State’s failure to
fulfill its duties under Articles 2 and 12–14 of the CAT.170 Thus,
adjudicators could infer acquiescence or “state approval” in
circumstances where officials fail to take effective preventive
measures or fail to properly investigate and prosecute acts of torture
committed by private actors.171 The guidelines endorsed the U.N.
Special Rapporteur’s reasoning that a lack of “due prevention and
diligence” by State officials fosters further acts of private violence and
therefore implies state responsibility through acquiescence.172
167.
Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, No. 161/2000, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000
(2002), ¶¶ 2.1–2.27, 9.1–9.5. Because it concluded that the harm suffered by the
complainant did not rise to the level of torture, the Committee based its ruling on
Article 16 of the CAT, which requires States to undertake to prevent acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and includes language on acquiescence identical
to that found in Article 1’s definition of torture. See id. ¶¶ 9.2–9.3.
168.
See id. at ¶¶ 8.5–8.14; see also Osmani v. Serbia, No. 261/2005, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/42/D/261/2005 (2009), ¶¶10.3–11 (finding that Serbia acquiesced in
an anti-Roma attack based on reasoning similar to Dzemajl).
169.
IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BD., CONSOLIDATED GROUNDS IN THE
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT—PERSONS IN NEED OF
PROTECTION—DANGER OF TORTURE § 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter CANADIAN
GUIDELINES] (explaining that Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
§ 97(1), S.C. 2001, c. 27, provides for a refugee-like status for a “person in need of
protection,” defined to include those whose removal would subject them to danger
of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the CAT).
170.
Id. § 5.2.6, at 43–45.
171.
Id. § 5.2.6, at 43. The guidelines added that even if a State has not
formally ratified the CAT, its failure to follow the obligations set forth in the
treaty should be considered a basis for finding acquiescence. Id.
172.
Id. § 5.2.6 at 44–45 (discussing and quoting 2001 Special Rapporteur
report, supra note 163). The guidelines went on to note that lack of success in
preventing acts of torture is not necessarily indicative of acquiescence where the
State has opposed the acts and attempted in good faith to prevent and protect
against them. Id. at 45.
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In November 2007, the U.N. Committee Against Torture
issued the extensive and highly influential General Comment No. 2
explicating Article 2 of the CAT, which requires States parties to take
effective measures to prevent acts of torture.173 The Comment begins
by noting that Article 2 sets out the core obligation of the treaty and
encompasses, but is not limited to, the more specific duties listed in
the provisions that follow.174 The Committee expressly endorsed the
“due diligence” standard and found that a failure by officials to act
diligently to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy torturous
activity constitutes “acquiescence” under Article 1’s torture
definition.175 Here are some of its key passages:
States parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or
other obstacles that impede the eradication of
torture . . . [and] take positive effective measures to
ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof
are effectively prevented . . . . If the measures adopted
by the State party fail to accomplish the[ir]
purpose . . . , the Convention requires that they be
revised and/or that new, more effective measures be
adopted. . . .

173.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (“Each State party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in
any territory under its jurisdiction.”); Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38; see also Lisa
Davis, Preventing Torture: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 11 N.Y.C. L.
REV. 179, 180 (2008) (describing the General Comment’s issuance and
importance); Felice D. Gaer, Opening Remarks: General Comment No. 2, 11
N.Y.C. L. REV. 187, 188–90 (2008) (reflecting the perspective of Felice Gaer—who
has served on the Committee since 2000 as an independent expert nominated by
the United States—on the Comment’s significance and the process by which the
Committee prepared it).
174.
Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1–3; see also MANFRED NOWAK, ET AL.,
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND ITS OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 79 (2d ed. 2019) (discussing article 2’s function as an
umbrella clause that sets forth the basic obligation which is elaborated upon in
the more specific articles that follow); CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE
AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 249 (2001) (discussing the same).
175.
Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶18; see also Rhonda Copelon, Gender
Violence as Torture: The Contribution of CAT General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y.C.
L. REV. 229, 254–55 (2008) (discussing the importance of General Comment No. 2
in clarifying the meaning of acquiescence under the CAT and linking it to the due
diligence obligation that had been developed in interpretations of the ICCPR and
American Convention).
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[W]here
State
authorities . . . know
or
have
reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture . . .
are being committed by non-State officials or private
actors and they fail to exercise due diligence to
prevent,
investigate,
prosecute
and
punish
[them] . . . , the State bears responsibility and its
officials should be considered as . . . responsible under
the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in
such impermissible acts. Since the failure of the State
to exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, sanction
and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates
and enables non-State actors to commit acts
impermissible under the Convention with impunity,
the State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of
encouragement and/or de facto permission . . . .
The protection of certain minority or marginalized
individuals or populations especially at risk of torture
is a part of the obligation to prevent torture or illtreatment . . . . States parties should, therefore,
ensure the protection of members of groups especially
at risk of being tortured, by fully prosecuting and
punishing all acts of violence and abuse against these
individuals and ensuring implementation of other
positive measures of prevention and protection . . . .176
The Committee Against Torture has applied the approach to
acquiescence elaborated in General Comment No. 2 in its comments
on States parties’ reports and decisions on individual complaints.177
In concluding observations on Greece’s report in 2012, the Committee
noted that despite some legislation and other measures taken to
address domestic violence and trafficking, the persistence of these
abuses and limited number of investigations and prosecutions
indicated that the State needed to undertake further “effective
preventive measures,” including prompt and effective law
enforcement response to allegations, awareness-raising campaigns
aimed at prevention, and support services for victims.178 In Njamba
and Balikosa v. Sweden, the Committee ruled in favor of a Congolese
176.
Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 4, 18, 21.
177.
See NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 174, at 87–88 (discussing the
Committee’s application of the due diligence principle).
178.
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, ¶¶ 23–24, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/GRC/CO/5-6 (June 27, 2012).
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mother and daughter who claimed that their deportation by Sweden
would violate Article 3 by exposing them to a high risk of sexual
violence in their home country. Relying primarily on country evidence
showing an “alarming number of cases of rape and sexual violence
throughout the country,” the Committee, sustaining the complaint,
referred to General Comment No. 2 and found that the authorities in
the Democratic Republic of Congo were not exercising due diligence to
prevent this widespread torturous activity.179 Reports by U.N. Special
Rapporteurs on Torture Manfred Nowak (2008), Juan Méndez (2016),
and Nils Melzer (2019) built upon General Comment No. 2 by
applying the due diligence approach to analyze the ways in which
States may acquiesce to torturous acts of “private” violence against
women and LGBTQI people.180
The due diligence standard for holding States responsible for
acts of torture committed by private actors has gained broad
acceptance in international human rights law since its emergence in
179.
Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden, No. 322/2007, ¶ 9.5, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/44/D/322/2007 (2010); see also Bakatu-Bja v. Sweden, ¶ 10.6, No. 279/2009,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/46/D/379/2009 (2011) (making similar findings in the case of
another woman fearing sexual violence in the DRC, and noting that “despite
efforts by authorities to combat it, this phenomenon is still widespread”); Dewage
v. Australia, No. 387/2009, ¶10.9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/51/387/2009 (2013) (referring
to General Comment No. 2 and the duty “to exercise due diligence to intervene
and stop the abuses” in discussing whether the Sri Lankan government would be
responsible for risks the complainant faced from a non-State group).
180.
For example, States may acquiesce through law enforcement officials’
failure to view offenses as serious and pursue them vigorously, undue leniency by
judges, maintaining discriminatory laws that keep women trapped in abusive
relationships, failing to take measures to address societal structures and values
that perpetuate domestic violence, statements made by political leaders that
dehumanize members of certain groups or defend practices like honor killings,
and laws criminalizing same-sex relations that encourage anti-gay violence. See
U.N. Secretary-General, Note to Members of the General Assembly on the Interim
Rep. of Special Rapporteur Nils Melzer on the Relevance of the Prohibition of
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the
Context of Domestic Violence, U.N. Doc. A/74/148 (July 12, 2019) [hereinafter
2019 SR Report] (discussing the CAT’s application to domestic violence); U.N.
Secretariat, Note to the Human Rights Council on the Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Juan E. Méndez, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57 (Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
2016 SR Report] (discussing the CAT’s application to gender-based and sexualitybased violence); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, to the Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter SR Report]
(discussing torture faced by women in relation to the CAT).
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the 1980s. First developed under ICCPR and regional treaties that
prohibit all torture—a prohibition the CAT was designed to make
more effective—it has become the prevailing interpretation of the
meaning of “acquiescence” under the CAT, as reflected in the
jurisprudence of the U.N. Committee Against Torture, successive
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture, and the Canadian guidelines.
The Committee Against Torture’s interpretations of the treaty
deserve particular weight because its ten independent experts are
elected by all the States parties,181 and the CAT expressly authorizes
the Committee to comment on State reports, initiate investigations of
systemic violations, and address complaints of violations made by
States or individuals.182

B. The Meaning of “Acquiescence” as a Matter of Treaty
Interpretation
The existence of an international consensus in favor of a due
diligence standard may not be sufficient by itself to convince U.S.
courts that this is the correct interpretation of the treaty. This
Section examines how this reading of acquiescence fares when the
usual judicial tools for interpreting treaties are applied to the CAT.
In construing treaties, the Supreme Court has taken an
approach generally consistent with that of the Vienna Convention on

181.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 17.
182.
CAT, supra note 1, arts. 19–22. The Committee’s authority to issue
general comments aimed at all States parties can be inferred from these
provisions. See INGELSE, supra note 174, at 150–52 (identifying sources of the
authority to issue general comments); Byrnes, supra note 159, at 529–30
(discussing the same). The BIA and courts have at times looked to the
Committee’s jurisprudence for guidance in interpreting the CAT. See supra notes
71–72, 76, 166 and accompanying text (discussing BIA consideration of
Committee’s interpretations); Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 555–56
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that although not binding the Committee’s
“pronouncements . . . may afford significant guidance in interpreting the language
of [the CAT]”), vacated on other grounds, Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235,
239 (3d Cir. 2008). In interpreting asylum law provisions that derive from refugee
treaties, U.S. courts often look to the interpretations of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, citing the significant implementing role the treaties
confer on that office. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–39, 439
n.22 (1987) (referencing such interpretations, including the UNHCR Handbook);
Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 154 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020) (referencing the UNHCR’s
Sexual Orientation Guidelines).
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the Law of Treaties,183 which calls for interpretation “in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”184
Evidence of context and purpose can be found, inter alia, in a treaty’s
preamble and in subsequent practice of the parties regarding the
treaty’s interpretation.185 The treaty’s negotiating history (travaux
préparatoires) may be consulted as a supplemental source.186 The
Supreme Court has echoed the Vienna Convention in stating that
“analysis must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in
which the written words are used,” giving “significant weight” to the
interpretations of “our sister signatories,” and referring to the treaty’s
drafting and negotiation history when helpful in resolving textual
ambiguities.187
Two things are worth noting at the outset. First, the
interpretation of “acquiescence” reached by the Committee Against
Torture, acting on behalf of all of the States parties, is evidence of
subsequent State practice reflecting a shared view by the parties
regarding the treaty’s meaning, and should receive significant weight

183.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Although the U.S. never ratified the Vienna Convention, the Executive Branch
has long treated it as an authoritative guide to treaty interpretation, and the
International Court of Justice has found that it reflects binding customary
international law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of
State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the Convention Against
Torture and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2013), at 7.
184.
Vienna Convention, supra note 183, at art. 31(1).
185.
Id. arts. 31(2)–(3) (providing that the “context” comprises “the text,
including its preamble and annexes” as well as any related agreements or
instruments made in connection with the treaty, and that “[t]here shall be taken
into account, together with the context: . . . (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation”).
186.
Id. art. 32 (providing that a treaty’s preparatory work may be
consulted to confirm the meaning derived by applying article 31, to resolve
ambiguities, or to avoid a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”).
187.
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397, 400, 404 (1985); see also
Olympic Airways v. Hussain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the importance of considering the interpretations of other States when
construing a treaty); see also Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authority in
U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 391, 405–20 (2013)
(discussing the role of interpretations by States parties in construing statutes that
incorporate treaty provisions).
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when the United States interprets the treaty.188 Second, as previously
noted, the ordinary meaning of the word “acquiescence” is ambiguous.
It has definitions that resonate with the idea of tacit consent or
approval, but it can also connote a failure to engage in serious effort
to stop something, even if one disapproves.189 To ascertain its
meaning in the CAT, we will need to look at the broader context of
how the term fits into the structure and purposes of the treaty, and
look for clues in the treaty’s drafting history. These travaux
préparatoires can be found in various U.N. documents that report on
the discussions and actions of the Working Group of the Commission
on Human Rights that developed the treaty from 1978–1984 and in a
1988 handbook on the CAT written by two diplomats who played a
central role in the drafting process, Herman Burgers of the
Netherlands and Hans Danelius of Sweden, which gives a detailed
account of its background and drafting.190
The treaty’s text provides some initial indications that the
drafters intended acquiescence to have a broad meaning. The term
appears in Article 1 as part of the phrase “consent or acquiescence,”
suggesting that it is not limited to acceptance or tacit approval, which
the word “consent” would have been adequate to cover.191 In addition,
Article 4 of the CAT requires States to criminalize not only acts of
torture, but also “an act by any person which constitutes complicity or
participation in torture,” without using the word “acquiescence.”192
This further suggests that acquiescence is not synonymous with
“complicity,” but has a broader scope.
The CAT’s preamble also provides relevant context for
interpreting the treaty’s terms, and it supports reading
“acquiescence” to encompass a due diligence obligation. The preamble
states that the parties agree to the Convention’s terms “having

188.
Canada’s incorporation of the due diligence standard into its
adjudicatory guidelines is further evidence of State practice. See CANADIAN
GUIDELINES, supra note 169 and text accompanying notes 169–172.
189.
See Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (citing one
dictionary definition); supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing other
dictionary definitions).
190.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at v–vi.
191.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
192.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (“Each State Party shall ensure that all
acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture.”)
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regard to” and desiring to effectuate the ICCPR’s and UDHR’s
prohibition of all torture.193 The reference to the ICCPR is especially
salient given that, by 1982, two years before the CAT was finalized,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee had interpreted the ICCPR’s
prohibition to entail a State duty to engage in effective preventive
efforts against private acts of torture.194
On the other hand, the history and context of the treaty also
reflects that the drafters were primarily focused on state-sponsored
torture, particularly against persons held in official detention. The
CAT developed from a declaration on torture adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in December 1975,195 which is referenced in the
CAT’s preamble.196 The Declaration was a response to a campaign to
abolish torture launched by Amnesty International in the early 1970s
that focused on the use of torture by repressive regimes.197 It was
drawn up by a U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders and it contained a definition of torture that
only covered acts “inflicted by or at the instigation of a public
official.”198 Two years after adopting the Declaration, the General
Assembly directed the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a
draft convention “in light of” the Declaration’s principles.199 The
193.
CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 4, 6 (“The States parties to this
Convention, . . . . Having regard to article 5 of the [UDHR] and article 7 of the
[ICCPR], both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to
torture . . . . Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture . . .
throughout the world, Have agreed as follows . . . .”).
194.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Article 17(2) of the CAT
also suggests the drafters desired that the CAT be interpreted in harmony with
the ICCPR. It provides that in nominating members of the Committee Against
Torture, States parties “shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons
who are also members of the Human Rights Committee,” the U.N. body that
oversees compliance with the ICCPR. See Byrnes, supra note 159, at 510–11.
195.
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter “Declaration”],
reprinted in BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 191.
196.
CAT, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 5 (“Having regard also to the
[Declaration]”).
197.
See Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 275, 294–307 (1994).
198.
Declaration, supra note 195, art. 1; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS,
supra note 4, at 13–17, 120 (tracing the events surrounding the adoption of the
Declaration in 1975).
199.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 120; G.A. Res. 32/62 (Dec. 8,
1977), reprinted in id. at 196 (discussing and setting forth the text of the G.A.
resolution). The resolution also invokes the ICCPR and UNDHR provisions
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Commission’s working group significantly expanded the torture
definition when it added the phrase “or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official.”200 Nonetheless, some CAT
commentators, especially in the treaty’s early years, emphasized the
State-focused context of the treaty’s drafting as reason to read the
State responsibility language narrowly, viewing it as reaching private
torturous conduct only when committed by persons who were acting
in some sense as agents of the State, furthering its purposes.201
The crucial question, then, is whether the addition of
“acquiescence” to the torture definition is best construed as
expanding State responsibility to reflect an affirmative duty to take
preventive action, or to have a narrower scope more akin to tacit
acceptance. The drafting history sheds some light on differing views
the amendment was meant to bridge. An initial draft prepared by the
Swedish government contained a torture definition essentially
identical to that of the U.N. Declaration, covering only acts “inflicted
by or at the instigation of a public official.”202 Discussion of whether
prohibiting all torture, as do the preambles of the Declaration and the CAT itself.
Id.; compare with Declaration, supra note 195, pmbl. ¶ 4, and CAT, supra note 1,
pmbl. ¶ 4.
200.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
201.
See, e.g., Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State:
International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84, 93 (1999) (characterizing the CAT’s torture
definition as requiring “infliction of suffering by the state for particular ends”);
Maxime E. Tardu, The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 56 NORDIC J. INT’L L.
303, 306 (1987) (stating that “acquiescence” was added to reach “‘do nothing’
attitudes towards vigilante and ‘death-squad’ groups” but would not apply to
other forms of private violence like severe domestic abuse); Natan Lerner, The
U.N. Convention on Torture, 16 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 126, 134 (1986) (viewing
CAT’s torture definition as covering only acts “inflicted by, or with the agreement
of, public officials”). Sir Nigel Rodley, whose statements as Special Rapporteur
helped spur the development of the due diligence approach, on other occasions
stressed that the CAT is primarily aimed at torture inflicted for State purposes
and viewed acquiescence as implying official collusion. See Nigel S. Rodley, The
Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 467,
484–87 (2002).
202.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Draft International Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1285 (Jan. 23, 1978), reprinted in BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 203 [hereinafter Original Swedish Draft]. In addition
to incorporating the Declaration’s definition of torture, the substantive provisions
of the original Swedish draft largely followed the Declaration, with the important
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that approach was too limited began in the Working Group’s first
session in 1978, and was taken up more intensively and resolved
when the group met again in early 1979.203 The canonical account of
these discussions is given by Burgers and Danelius:
There were different opinions on the question as to
whether or not the definition of torture in the
convention should be limited to acts of public officials.
It was pointed out by many States that the purpose of
the convention was to provide protection against acts
committed on behalf of, or at least tolerated by, the
public authorities, whereas the State could normally
be expected to take action according to its criminal
law against private persons having committed acts of
torture against other persons. However, France
considered that the definition of the act of torture
[focus on] the act of torture itself, irrespective of the
status of the perpetrator.
Although there was little support for the French view
on this matter, most States agreed that the
convention should not only be applicable to acts
committed by public officials, but also to acts for
which the public authorities could otherwise
considered to have some responsibility. [In place of
the language used in the original Swedish draft], the
United States preferred the concept of “acquiescence
of” rather than “instigation by” a public official. . . . In
the end, it was generally agreed that the definition of
acts committed by public officials should be expanded
to cover acts committed by, or at the instigation of, or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
any other person acting in an official capacity.204
addition of a non-refoulement provision, which was inspired by the European case
law. Id. at 35.
203.
Id. at 38–46.
204.
Id. at 45–46. To the extent Burgers and Danelius imply that only
France favored covering private actors in all cases, their summary is inaccurate.
The Working Group’s report notes that some delegates took the view that the
definition of torture “should not be restricted to ‘public officials’ . . . [but] should be
made applicable to all individuals under the jurisdiction of a contracting State,”
while others expressed a contrasting view that torture by private actors “should
be covered by existing or future national law, and that international action was
primarily designed to cover situations where national action was otherwise least
likely.” The report adds that the addition of “consent or acquiescence” was
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The authors inferred from this drafting history that “the rather wide
phrase” adopted in compromise should cover situations “where the
responsibility of the authorities is somehow engaged” but not purely
private actions where “it can be expected that the normal machinery
of justice will operate and that prosecution and punishment will
follow under the normal operation of the domestic legal system.”205
That, of course, raises the question of when the authorities
should be regarded as “somehow” responsible for private parties’
torturous actions. The compromise language that was adopted left the
answer unclear.206 In a pathbreaking 1994 article on domestic
violence as torture, Rhonda Copelon pointed out that where legal
sanctions are absent or insufficiently enforced, the assumption the
torture definition rests on––that it can be expected that a country’s
domestic legal system will adequately deal with private criminal
“designed to satisfy those delegates who sought a broad definition of torture,
which covered both public and private individuals” as well as those in the other
camp. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Working Group on a Draft Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, ¶¶ 17–18, 23–25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1470 (Mar. 12, 1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Working Group Report]. In comments offered at various other
times during the CAT’s drafting, a number of States expressed the view that
torture should be defined to include private acts regardless of whether the State
can be deemed responsible. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 174, at 34–36.
205.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119–20; see also id. at 1
(stating that the Convention “only relates to practices that occur under some sort
of responsibility of public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity”).
Other material in the travaux indicates that the addition of the phrase “or other
person acting in an official capacity” similarly represented a compromise between
those taking the view that “public official” should be broadened to include nonState actors who wield effective, government-like authority over others, and those
who viewed the term more narrowly. Id. at 45–46; see also Samuel L. David, A
Foul Immigration Policy, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 785–89 (2003)
(discussing this aspect of the drafting history); Pnina Baruh Sharvit, The
Definition of Torture in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM.
RTS. 147, 166 (1993) (noting the Convention’s lack of clarity on whether it covers
torture carried out by non-State political entities such as guerillas).
206.
See Yuval Ginbar, Making Human Rights Sense of the Torture
Definition, in TORTURE AND ITS DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9,
at 273, 281–82 (observing that even though the CAT’s drafters had the situation
of state detention primarily in mind, they chose “quite wide” language on official
responsibility that allowed for development of the due diligence approach);
McCorquodale & La Forgia, supra note 73, at 206 (arguing that the absence of a
clear definition of acquiescence under the CAT warrants adopting the approach to
State responsibility developed under other human rights treaties).
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acts––has not been fulfilled. The State thus bears some responsibility
for the resulting impunity.207 Other commentators have similarly
noted that the drafters’ rationale for limiting the torture definition to
situations where officials could be considered to bear some
responsibility supports defining “acquiescence” with reference to
whether officials properly fulfill the functions of a domestic legal
system by taking all reasonable preventive and prosecutorial
measures.208 Even if a due diligence obligation was not expressly
contemplated by the CAT’s drafters, it is consistent with the
reasoning behind the compromise they reached.
But there is more. Prior scholarship and judicial discussions
have overlooked important evidence from the CAT’s drafting history
which shows that when the United States proposed adding
“acquiescence” to the torture definition it expressly tied the concept to
the idea that officials have a legal responsibility under the CAT to
take appropriate preventive measures to counter all acts of torture of
which they are aware, no matter who commits them.209
When the Working Group began meeting in 1978, it had
before it two initial drafts, one submitted by the International

207.
Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 299, 342–44, 355–56
(1994).
208.
Commentators have linked acquiescence to a State’s failure to fulfill
the drafters’ expectation that domestic legal systems will adequately deal with
acts of private torture. See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446–47; INGELSE, supra
note 174, at 225; Jane McAdam, Part III—Rights and Remedies: The Convention
Against Torture Alternative Asylum Mechanisms, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 627,
630–31 (2004); Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to their Convention Obligations:
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad
Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 304 (2003); CAMILLE
GIFFORD, HUM. RTS. CTR., UNIV. OF ESSEX, THE TORTURE REPORTING HANDBOOK
21 (2000); David Weissbrodt & Isabel Höreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement:
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement
Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 51–52 (1999).
209.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, when it adopted the “willful
blindness” standard, cited the original U.S. proposal to support its conclusion that
acquiescence does not require actual knowledge of torturous activity. It did not
address the aspect of the U.S. proposal discussed here—how it shows that
acquiescence was meant to go beyond willful blindness and encompass failures by
officials to take appropriate preventive measures. Silva-Renfigo v. Att’y Gen., 473
F.3d 58, 68 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Association of Penal Law (IAPL), and the other the previouslymentioned Swedish draft.210 The IAPL draft contained a definition of
torture that reached not only acts committed “by or at the instigation”
of a public official, but also acts “for which a public official is
responsible,” defined in a separate Article to include situations where
an official who is aware of torturous activity “fails to take appropriate
measures to prevent or suppress torture . . . and has the authority or
is in a position to take such measures.”211
In comments submitted in advance of the Working Group’s
1979 session, the United States proposed modifying Sweden’s draft by
adding “consent or acquiescence” to the torture definition. The
purpose of this change, the United States explained, was “so that
public officials have a clear duty to act to prevent torture.” It added
that “[t]his duty is further elaborated in the new article 2 proposed by
the United States.”212 The United States’ proposed Article 2 was
closely modeled on the IAPL’s article on official responsibility. It
provided that any public official who “fails to take appropriate
measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has
knowledge or should have knowledge that torture has or is being
committed and has the authority or is in the position to take such
measures” is responsible within the meaning of the Convention.213
When the Working Group resumed its meetings in 1979, it
had before it the United States’ written comments as well as two
revised drafts prepared by Sweden and the International Commission
210.
See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 26, 31, 34–38; see also id.
at 197 (reprinting the IAPL draft), 203 (reprinting the original Swedish draft).
Some elements of the IAPL draft were later incorporated into the revised Swedish
draft that became the basis for the Working Group’s deliberations on the treaty’s
text. Id. at 26; see also RODLEY, supra note 148, at 48 (noting the IAPL draft may
well have influenced Sweden’s proposals).
211.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 197. A regional InterAmerican torture treaty finalized shortly after the CAT took an approach similar
to the IAPL draft by including an Article that extended responsibility for torture
to a public official who “being able to prevent it, fails to do so.” Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1985, art.
3(a), O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987). It also defined torture
without reference to any degree of State involvement, thereby obligating State
parties to take “effective measures to prevent and punish” torturous acts
committed by private parties. Id. arts. 2, 6.
212.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summary prepared by the Secretary-General
in accordance with Commission resolution 18 (XXXIV), ¶ 29, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1314 (Dec. 19, 1978).
213.
Id. ¶ 45.
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of Jurists, both of which incorporated the United States’ proposed
“consent or acquiescence” wording into their torture definitions, but
did not include the additional U.S.-proposed article concerning the
scope of officials’ responsibility.214 The Working Group’s records offer
no explanation for the failure to take up the additional provision on
the scope of officials’ responsibility, but the decision could be
explained by the fact that both the original and revised Swedish
drafts already included, in Article 2, a broad requirement that States
take effective measures to prevent acts of torture in their
territories.215 A separate article stating that officials are responsible if
they fail to take appropriate preventive measures may have seemed
redundant.
Another aspect of the drafting history, also overlooked in
prior scholarship, lends additional support to reading “acquiescence”
to encompass a duty of due diligence. The Committee Against
Torture’s General Comment No. 2 defines acquiescence in relation to
officials’ failure to fulfill Article 2’s duty to take effective measures to
prevent acts of torture and/or some of the more specific obligations set
out in subsequent articles.216 The case for linking acquiescence to
those duties is more convincing if those articles of the CAT can be
fairly read to obligate States to take effective measures to prevent
torturous activity by non-State actors, without regard to whether
public officials acquiesce or are otherwise responsible. Otherwise,
there is a certain circularity to tying acquiescence to the Article 2
requirement of effective measures to prevent acts of torture—it
amounts to saying that in order to avoid acquiescing, the State must
take effective measures to prevent acts to which its officials
acquiesce.217
214.
See 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 204, ¶¶ 11–13, 16; see
also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 39–44 (discussing the Working
Group’s deliberations), 208 (reprinting the revised Swedish draft).
215.
See 1979 Working Group Report, supra note 204, ¶¶ 17–18, 23–25, 30–
36; see also Ahcene Boulesbaa, Analysis and Proposals for the Rectification of the
Ambiguities Inherent in Article 1 of the U.N. Convention on Torture, 5 FLA. INT’L
L.J. 293, 313–15 (1990) (suggesting that the IAPL’s provision on official
responsibility may be helpful in interpreting the CAT’s ambiguous language
regarding when torture by private actors is covered).
216.
See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
217.
The duty can be conceived of in that way—one member of the
Committee Against Torture has characterized Article 2 as creating an obligation
to ensure that officials do not acquiesce to torture by failing to take effective
measures to stop acts committed by non-State parties that, if acquiesced to by
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There is, in fact, a basis in the CAT’s text for reading the
phrase “acts of torture,” which is the phrase used (as opposed to
simply “torture”) in Article 2 and several other key articles that
require preventive or remedial measures, to indicate that those duties
extend to acts of torture by non-State actors, even in the absence of
official acquiescence.218 Article 1’s definition of torture, as U.N.
Special Rapporteur Nils Melzer observed, consists of a “substantive
component” defining the conduct that amounts to torture followed by
an “attributive component” that defines the level of State involvement
needed to trigger the State’s responsibility as a matter of
international law.219 The phrase “act of torture” can reasonably be
read to refer only to the substantive component of Article 1’s torture
definition—the part defining the act—and not its final phrase,
“when . . . inflicted by or . . . with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official,” which does not concern the act but rather when the
State will be deemed responsible for it.220
State officials, amount to torture. See Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of Torture:
The Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 CUNY L. REV. 293, 297–98
(2012). But that is a complex way of looking at it, and the link between
acquiescence and State failure to fulfill Article 2’s preventive duty is more
intuitively appealing if Article 2 can be read to directly require officials to take
effective measures against all known torturous activity, regardless of whether
officials bear any responsibility for it.
218.
The phrases “acts of torture” or “act of torture” are used in Article 2
(duty to take effective measures to prevent acts of torture in territories under the
State’s jurisdiction), Article 4 (duty to ensure all acts of torture are offenses under
criminal law), Articles 12–13 (duties to promptly and impartially investigate and
protect complainants and witnesses against retaliation), and Article 14 (duty to
ensure the right to redress in the legal system). Certain other provisions instead
refer to “torture”: Article 3 (non-refoulement to another State where a person
faces “danger of being subjected to torture”), and Article 15 (inadmissibility of
statements made as a result of torture).
219.
2019 Special Rapporteur Rep., supra note 180, ¶¶ 5–6.
220.
The Committee Against Torture, in its comments on State party
reports, appears to read “acts of torture” in that manner when it faults countries
for not criminalizing, investigating, or otherwise effectively countering torturous
conduct by non-State actors. See, e.g., Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture—Albania, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/ALB (June
21, 2005) (criticizing authorities’ reluctance to adopt measures to counter
domestic and sexual violence and to promptly and impartially investigate such
incidents); Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture—Cameroon, ¶¶ 7(b)–(c), 11(c)–(d), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/31/6 (Feb. 11,
2004) (faulting the absence of legislation banning female genital mutilation and
an exemption from punishment for rape if the rapist marries the victim);
EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 218 (describing several other examples); see also
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The evolution of the CAT’s text lends support to that reading.
In the 1975 U.N. Declaration, every time the phrase “acts of torture”
appeared, it was qualified with additional language (“acts of torture
as defined in article 1” or “acts of torture . . . committed by or at the
instigation of a public official”) to indicate that it referred only to
those torturous acts for which the State was responsible.221 Sweden’s
initial 1978 draft of the treaty retained most of that qualifying
language.222 However, the revised Swedish draft of 1979, which
incorporated the U.S.-proposed “consent or acquiescence” language,
dropped all prior qualifiers that had restricted the meaning of “acts of
torture.”223 This was consistent with the tenor of the U.S.
acquiescence proposal, which was predicated on the idea that officials
have a duty to take appropriate preventive measures when they know
or have reason to know of acts of torture by private parties.
Two other arguments that might be made in defense of
restricting “acquiescence” to acts committed with the authorities’
tacit approval can be briefly disposed of. One concerns the fact that
the torture definition covers only pain or suffering intentionally
inflicted “for such purposes as” obtaining information or a confession,
punishing for an actual or suspected act, intimidating or coercing the
person or a third party, “or for any reason based on discrimination of

Josephine A. Vining, Providing Protection from Torture by “Unofficial” Actors, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 331, 344–45 (2004) (noting that broad wording of Article 2
supports an official obligation to prevent and punish all acts of torture, including
those by non-State actors). But see Paola Gaeta, When is the Involvement of State
Officials a Requirement for the Crime of Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 183, 190–
91 (2008) (arguing the CAT requires countries to criminalize only torture that
occurs with official involvement or acquiescence to avoid excessive international
intrusion into domestic criminal matters).
221.
Declaration, supra note 195, arts. 7, 9–11.
222.
Original Swedish Draft, supra note 202, arts. 7, 9, 11.
223.
Revised text of the substantive parts of the Draft Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
submitted by Sweden on 19 February 1979, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1,
reprinted in BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 208. The revised Swedish
draft also introduced the phrase “prevent acts of torture” into Article 2. The
predecessor Articles in the U.N. Declaration and the original Swedish draft spoke
of a State duty to prevent “torture,” a term that would take its meaning from the
entire torture definition, not just its substantive component. Cf. id. at 192 (arts.
3–4 of the Declaration), 203 (art. 2 of the Original Swedish Draft), 208 (art. 2 of
the Revised Swedish Draft).
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any kind.”224 Burgers and Danelius viewed the listed purposes as
having in common “the existence of some—even remote—connection
with the interests or policies of the State and its organs.”225 Private
actors who inflict torture against the State’s wishes cannot be said to
be acting to further the State’s policies or interests. But the CAT’s
listing of purposes just as easily describes the motivations of private
torture. Gangs employ violence to coerce, intimidate, or punish;
attacks on racial minorities or LGBTQI people, and practices like
female genital cutting and honor killings, are based on
discrimination; and domestic violence and rape are inflicted to coerce,
intimidate, and punish, in addition to being rooted in gender
discrimination.226 Privately-inflicted acts easily satisfy the torture
definition’s purpose requirement.227
Another requirement often read into the CAT’s torture
definition—although appearing nowhere in the treaty’s text—is that
the victim must be detained or otherwise under the control of the
224.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1. It is important to bear in mind that this
purpose requirement applies to the person actually inflicting the pain or suffering.
There is no requirement that a public official who acquiesces to the act of torture
be motivated by one of these purposes. See Walker v. Lynch, 657 F. App’x. 45, 47–
48 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding BIA erred in finding no acquiescence because Jamaican
officials’ failure to investigate anti-gay attacks had not been shown to be
purposeful and based on the victims’ sexuality); see also Cherichel v. Holder, 591
F.3d 1002, 1013 n.14 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “it is the torturer who must
possess the specific intent to inflict severe . . . pain or suffering, not necessarily
the state actor”); Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding the
same).
225.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 118–19; see also Rodley, supra
note 201, at 484–85 (stating that the list of purposes in the torture definition
reflects “the purposes of an organized political entity exercising effective power”
and indicates that the typical torturer will be an official or someone acting to
further state purposes).
226.
See Copelon, supra note 207, at 329–40.
227.
The Canadian CAT guidelines point out that Burgers and Danelius’
view that the purpose element is linked to State interests or policies “is difficult to
reconcile with the other purposes, which are not explicitly concerned with the
maintenance and exercise or state power, but merely with the exercise of power or
control over the victim.” CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 169, at 45–46; see also
Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture: US and UN Standards, 28
HUM. RTS. Q. 809, 830–32 (2008) (accepting that the CAT’s purposes bear a
relation to State interests but pointing out that at their core, the listed purposes
presuppose a situation of a perpetrator exercising control over a powerless victim);
Rosati, supra note 12, at 542–43 (noting that purposes such as “intimidation” and
“coercion” are so broad “almost any reason for intentional torture would fall
within” them).
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person inflicting the harm. Burgers and Danelius saw this as a
necessary corollary of the CAT’s purpose and drafting history;
otherwise, they argued, coercive but legitimate uses of force by a
nation’s police or military while making arrests, quelling violence, or
defending the country could be considered acts of torture.228 The U.S.
ratification resolution explicitly provided that “the United States
understands that the definition of torture in Article 1 is intended to
apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender’s custody or
physical control.”229 If this limited the torture definition to persons in
official custody, it would mean that few if any private acts, other than
prisoner-on-prisoner violence, would be covered. But the restriction
cannot be read in that way because the reference is not to an official’s
custody or control, but rather to the offender’s.230 Torturous acts,
whether committed by an official or a non-State actor, and whether
occurring within or outside a detention facility, nearly always take
place while the victim is under the perpetrator’s physical control or
custody and prevented from leaving by force or threats.231
The CAT’s text, context, purpose, and drafting history offer
ample support for an interpretation that ties acquiescence to breach
of officials’ duty to act diligently and take effective measures to
prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture, including
228.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 120–21; see also Nowak, supra
note 227, at 832–33 (arguing that torture under the CAT “presupposes a situation
of powerlessness of the victim” and does not include justifiable uses of force while
making arrests or preventing escape).
229.
136 Cong. Rec. 36,198–99 (1990); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(6)
(2020) (codifying the Senate understanding in immigration regulations).
230.
The BIA, in a decision that addressed whether atrocious detention
conditions in Haiti amounted to torture, erroneously listed as one of the torture
definition’s elements that the acts must be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical
control of the victim.” Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (B.I.A. 2002). In the
sole reported case where the BIA rejected a CAT claim on the ground that the
feared conduct (genital cutting) would not occur under State officials’ custody or
control, its decision was vacated by an appeals court because the Senate
understanding and regulation are clearly satisfied where a person “would likely
suffer torture while under private parties’ exclusive custody or physical control.”
Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2004).
231.
See, e.g., V.L. v. Switzerland, No. 262/2005, ¶ 8.10, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 (Nov. 20, 2006) (finding that when the complainant was
raped she clearly was under the physical control of her rapists—in this case police
officers—even though the rapes occurred outside of detention facilities). One can
imagine rare exceptions including, for example, a person shot at a distance by a
sniper.
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those committed by non-State actors. That reading is most consistent
with the rationale behind the compromise reached by the drafters,
which excluded purely private torture from the torture definition
based on the assumption that “prosecution and punishment will
follow under the normal operation of the domestic legal system.”232
The due diligence approach identifies those circumstances in which
that assumption is not fulfilled. The due diligence standard also
accords with what the United States indicated it meant by
acquiescence when it proposed adding the term to the CAT’s torture
definition. Moreover, it has the virtue of making the CAT congruent
with how private torture is treated under other human rights
instruments, consistent with the CAT’s stated objective of making the
enforcement of the already existing prohibition of torture in
international law more effective.233

III. THE UNITED STATES’ RATIFICATION UNDERSTANDING:
INCORPORATING STATE PREVENTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Senate’s ratification understanding, which, as Congress
directed in FARRA, was incorporated into U.S. immigration
regulations, defines acquiescence to require that an official have
“awareness” of torturous activity and “thereafter breach his legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”234 Although the
legislative history addresses what was meant by “awareness,”235 it
does not discuss whether “legal responsibility” was meant to include
232.
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 119–20.
233.
To the extent doubt remains, the protective purpose of Article 3 of the
CAT, which is meant to safeguard against deporting people to places where they
would face grievous harm, also counsels in favor of a broad construction of the
term “acquiescence.” Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)
(discussing the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in
deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” especially where “death or persecution”
is at stake); see also Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of
Victim Protection Under the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 801–
05 (2009) (arguing that Article 3’s protective purpose warrants putting a greater
focus on the harm faced by the individual than the government actor’s
culpability).
234.
136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (2020) (worded
identically except “his” was changed to “his or her”); see generally supra Section
I.A.
235.
As discussed in Section I.A, the drafters chose the word “awareness” to
indicate that actual knowledge is not needed and willful blindness suffices.
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obligations arising under international law or only duties imposed by
the laws of the official’s country.236 But, as this Part shows, a
preponderance of the textual and contextual clues favor looking to
international as well as domestic law. That is also how the INS, the
agency charged with implementation, understood the acquiescence
understanding in the first authoritative guidance it issued on the
subject.237
When the text of a draft Convention was completed in 1984,
the U.N. Secretary-General forwarded it to all governments to invite
their comments in advance of the General Assembly vote.238 The
statement submitted by the United States made a point of standing
by all the interpretive positions it had taken during the negotiations:
Representatives of the United States Government
participated actively throughout the sessions of the
Working Group . . . . During the course of these
negotiations, [they] made a number of declarations
and interpretive statements which are contained in
the official records of the negotiations, a part of the
legislative history of the convention. The United
States, in expressing its support for the draft
convention and for approval of it by the United
Nations General Assembly, maintains all of the
declarations and interpretive statements made on its
behalf throughout the course of the negotiations.239
One of those interpretive positions, as we have seen, was that
the phrase “consent or acquiescence” should be added to the torture
definition “so that public officials have a clear duty to act to prevent
torture” in accordance with an obligation arising under the CAT to
take appropriate measures within their power to suppress any
torture of which they become aware.240

236.
See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446 (noting that the U.S.
understanding did not “specify to what legal responsibilities it referred”); Rosati,
supra note 12, at 538 (same).
237.
See infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text (discussing a 1997
memo issued by the agency’s General Counsel, David A. Martin).
238.
See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 99–102.
239.
U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at 20, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/39/499 (Oct. 2, 1984)
(containing replies received from governments, including the U.S., to comment on
the draft Convention) [hereinafter 1984 U.S. Statement].
240.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV), ¶¶ 29, 45, U.N. Doc.

804

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[52.2

The 1984 statement went on to specifically mention, as an
example of the interpretive stances maintained by the United States,
its view that international law must be considered when interpreting
another key phrase in the torture definition. Article 1 of the CAT
includes a sentence providing that torture “does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.”241 The United States reminded other countries of its
position that “[t]he reference to ‘lawful sanctions’ . . . must be
understood to mean sanctions which are lawful under both national
and international law.”242
When the State Department transmitted the CAT to the
Senate in 1988, it backtracked on this issue, likely due to concerns
expressed by the Justice Department.243 The Reagan Administration
package of ratification conditions included a number of
understandings aimed at protecting law enforcement interests,
among them one providing that “lawful sanctions” include “not only
judicially-imposed sanctions but also other enforcement actions
authorized by U.S. law or by judicial interpretations of such law.”244
This implied that the question of whether a sanction is lawful, and
E/CN.4/1314 (Dec. 19, 1978); see generally supra notes 209–15 and accompanying
text.
241.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
242.
1984 U.S. Statement, supra note 239, at 21, ¶ 5. The CAT’s drafting
history indicates that State parties could not agree on the “lawful sanctions”
exception’s scope and therefore “left open whether this exception refers only to the
contents of national law or whether a sanction, in order to be lawful, must also
comply with certain international humanitarian standards.” BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 47.
243.
See President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at v–vi (letter from
Secretary of State George Shultz referencing the Department of Justice’s approval
of the proposed ratification conditions); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at 453
(“Most of the problems [the CAT] posed with respect to U.S. ratification turned on
the manner in which the Convention affected law enforcement interests.”).
244.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5. The package also
contained provisions—later dropped or greatly modified by the Bush
Administration—that would have limited the torture definition to “extremely
cruel” acts “specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or
mental pain or suffering,” allowed “relevant common law defenses” to charges of
torture, and refused to recognize the Committee Against Torture’s competence to
investigate charges of systematic torture in the United States or hear any
complaints made against the United States by other countries or individuals. Id.
at 4–7, 17; see also Senate Report, supra note 4, at 35–38 (reprinting 1989 State
Department letter to Senator Pell containing the Bush Administration’s revised
ratification conditions and explaining reasons for changes).
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therefore exempt from the definition of torture, was to be determined
solely by reference to domestic, not international law.
The proposed acquiescence understanding, in contrast,
referred to an official’s “legal responsibility” with no qualifying
language to suggest that the term was limited to domestic legal
duties. The words chosen (“have knowledge of such activity and
thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
activity”245) also presuppose that an official has such a legal
responsibility, the existence of which does not depend on the vagaries
of any one country’s laws. This wording is consistent with the stance
taken by the United States in the treaty negotiations that officials
have a legal responsibility under the CAT to take appropriate
measures to counter known acts of torture, and are deemed to
acquiesce when they fail to do so.246
The subsequent history of the Reagan “lawful sanctions”
proposal also points toward looking to the CAT and international law
as sources of official obligation. The effort to exempt all enforcement
actions authorized by U.S. law from the definition of torture drew
criticism from human rights groups for creating a loophole that
undermined the treaty. Its logic would have allowed States to impose
torturous punishments like flogging or amputation so long as the
country’s laws authorized them. The Bush Administration agreed
with this critique and in its 1989 revised package of conditions added
the phrase, “provided that such sanctions or actions are not clearly
prohibited under international law.”247 This was further amended on
the Senate floor to read: “Nonetheless, the United States understands
that a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the
object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.”248
245.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 5; see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text (reprinting complete text of the Reagan-proposed acquiescence
understanding).
246.
See WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446 (noting that the U.S.
ratification understanding reflected the way in which the U.S. had developed the
term during the drafting of the Convention).
247.
See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 10; Senate Report, supra note 4,
at 5–6, 35–36; Stewart, supra note 43, at 457.
248.
136 Cong. Rec. 36,192–99 (1990). This amendment was facilitated by
Senator Pell, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in
consultation with the Bush Administration in order to placate Senator Jesse
Helms, the Committee’s ranking Republican, who was averse to having U.S.
legislation cite international law because of concerns about sovereignty and the
primacy of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 36,193–94; Senate Hearing, supra note 45,
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The Bush Administration never altered the “legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent torture” language of the
proposed acquiescence understanding. The only change it made was
to broaden it by changing the word “knowledge” to “awareness.”249
The same concerns that led the Bush Administration to clarify that
sanctions must be consistent with international law in order to be
lawful would have counseled against limiting “legal responsibility” in
the acquiescence understanding to domestic legal duties. Making
acquiescence dependent on a violation of national law would allow
countries to absolve themselves of all responsibility for acts of private
torture simply by providing in their laws that officials have no legal
obligation to intervene. And it would allow an individual to be
deported to face torture in a country where officials would do nothing
to prevent it, so long as that country’s laws do not require officials to
do anything. Such an interpretation would undermine the CAT’s
object and purpose, and render “acquiescence” all but meaningless.
When the Bush Administration presented its revised package
of ratification conditions to Congress in late 1989, the State
Department was undoubtedly aware that international law had been
interpreted to impose duties on public officials to take effective
measures to prevent private acts of torture. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee’s 1982 general comment on the ICCPR and the much
publicized 1988 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Velásquez Rodríguez pointed strongly in the direction of a
due diligence obligation.250 The Bush Administration was attuned to
the risk that international tribunals might interpret the CAT in a
way unacceptable to the United States and sought safeguards where
it had such concerns. The original Reagan Administration package
included an understanding providing that Article 16’s prohibition of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIDT) covered only cruel
and unusual treatment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.251 The
Bush Administration reclassified it as a formal reservation which,
unlike an understanding, restricted the legal obligations that the U.S.

at 42. It probably escaped Helms’s attention that the reference to “legal
responsibility” in the acquiescence understanding was broad enough to cover
international law; or perhaps he was willing to tolerate some ambiguity as long as
the hated words were not used.
249.
See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.
250.
See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
251.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 15–16.

2021]

Obscured by “Willful Blindness”

807

would assume in ratifying the treaty.252 In testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, officials drew specific attention
to decisions of human rights tribunals condemning treatment the
United States considered constitutionally acceptable,253 especially the
European Court of Human Rights’ 1989 Soering decision, which
blocked the extradition of a man charged with murder to the U.S. on
the ground that he faced the prospect of years on death row, an
inhuman or degrading treatment.254
By contrast, the Administration expressed no concerns about
overbroad
international
interpretations
of
officials’
legal
responsibility to prevent torturous activity, despite the prominent
and recent international jurisprudence finding that officials had a
legal duty to take effective measures against torture by non-State
actors. Nor was the acquiescence understanding made into a
reservation. This suggests that the Bush Administration viewed its
approach to acquiescence as consistent with international law and
had no objection to the emerging due diligence jurisprudence.255 The
252.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8, 36; see also Stewart, supra note 43,
at 460–61, n.40 (noting that the change was made because the “intended legal
effect was in fact to restrict” U.S. obligations under the treaty).
253.
See Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 5–6, 11, 18, 39 (statements and
testimony of State Dep’t Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer and Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen. Mark Richard); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at 460–62 (discussing
Administration concerns that broad international interpretations of CIDT would
conflict with U.S. practices, such as death row and the death penalty).
254.
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, ¶ 88 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 7, 1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 (on file with the
Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
255.
In 2008, years after the United States ratified the CAT, the George W.
Bush Administration submitted a document to the Committee Against Torture
that took issue with various aspects of the Committee’s recently issued General
Comment No. 2, including its statement that failure to respond to private torture
with due diligence constitutes “acquiescence.” Observations by the United States
of America on Committee Against Torture General Comment No. 2:
Implementation of Article 2 by States’ Parties ¶¶ 20–21 (Nov. 3, 2008). These
comments came at a time of significant tension between the United States and the
international community over the torture and mistreatment of detainees held by
military and intelligence agencies at “black site” locations outside U.S. territory.
See id. ¶¶ 26–28 (disagreeing with the Committee’s view that the CAT creates a
duty to prevent torture in all places where a State exercises de facto control).
Under the Obama Administration, the State Department’s Office of the Legal
Adviser disavowed several of the prior Administration’s positions that purported
to limit the scope of U.S. obligations under the CAT. See Koh, supra note 183, at
1–6, 43–56, 66–73, 85–90. In any event, the George W. Bush Administration’s
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State and Justice Department officials who testified before the Senate
stressed that most of the U.S. understandings furthered the CAT’s
aims and “will favorably affect the evolution of the concept of torture
under international law.”256 When the United States deposited its
instrument of ratification with the United Nations, several other
countries that had ratified the treaty objected to the U.S. reservation
on the scope of CIDT and to a U.S. understanding narrowly
construing when mental pain and suffering amounts to torture, but
none objected to the acquiescence understanding.257 A number of
commentators viewed it as taking a broad approach to acquiescence
that would be helpful internationally in clarifying the meaning of the
term.258
But even if the U.S. officials who proposed the acquiescence
understanding did not anticipate that due diligence would become the
international law standard for State responsibility, this ultimately
should make no difference in how the unrestricted phrase “legal
responsibility” in the acquiescence understanding is interpreted.
Legal responsibilities exist under international law as well as
domestic law and the Senate understanding did not exclude the
former. As the Supreme Court recently noted in applying Title VII to
positions shed no useful light on the intent of the George H.W. Bush
Administration and the Senate at the time the United States ratified the CAT in
1990.
256.
Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 13, 16, 39 (testimony and prepared
statement of Mark Richard, and testimony of Abraham Sofaer). The Justice
Department’s testimony was delivered by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General
from the Criminal Division who explained that his agency’s concerns all related to
the need to clarify the torture definition so that the United States could meet its
treaty obligation to make all acts of torture criminally punishable without
running afoul of due process constraints. Id. at 1–16. With respect to
acquiescence, that meant ensuring that officials could not be held accountable
unless they had prior awareness of torturous activity (through actual knowledge
or willful blindness) and breached a legal responsibility to intervene. Id. at 14, 17.
The Justice Department did not express any concerns about the source or scope of
that legal responsibility.
257.
See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to
Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 807 (2012)
(summarizing all objections made to the U.S. reservations and understandings).
258.
For examples of scholars who regarded the U.S. acquiescence
understanding as progressive, see WOUTERS, supra note 84, at 446; Alexander,
supra note 14, at 937; Rosati, supra note 12, at 539; and Magee, supra note 45, at
830–31. But see NOWAK ET AL., supra note 174, at 40–41 (viewing all the U.S.
understandings, including the one on acquiescence, as inappropriate efforts to
limit the torture definition’s scope).
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sexual orientation discrimination, statutes are not limited to
applications that were expected at the time of enactment and “[w]hen
Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts
should apply the broad rule.”259
The ratification history includes two statements that might
be read to cut against a broad conception of the legal responsibilities
referenced in the Senate understanding. Viewed in context, however,
they do not support excluding obligations arising under international
law. A prepared statement submitted by the Justice Department at
the Senate hearing observed that the acquiescence understanding
“reflects an intention that the criminal sanctions contained in the
Convention for action constituting torture be focused on knowing
misconduct as opposed to negligent inaction.”260 That remark was
consistent with the Department’s view that Article 4 of the CAT,
which requires States to criminalize “complicity or participation in
torture” as well as actual or attempted torturous acts, does not
require criminalizing negligent inaction.261 The Reagan and Bush
Administrations repeatedly assured the Senate that existing state
and federal criminal laws were sufficient to comply with Article 4
because they covered conspiracies as well as any actual or attempted
acts of torture.262 Whatever acquiescence means, it is clearly broader
than conspiracy. The Reagan and Bush Administrations’ stance that
existing criminal laws fulfilled U.S. obligations under Article 4
indicates that they viewed the treaty as requiring criminal sanctions
259.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736 (2020).
260.
Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 17 (prepared statement of Mark
Richard). This may have been meant to refer to the “awareness” element of
acquiescence, which can be established by willful blindness, a form of knowing
misconduct, but not by a merely negligent lack of knowledge. See supra notes 58–
59, 109 and accompanying text.
261.
Article 4, paragraph 1 provides: “Each State Party shall ensure that
all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture.” Paragraph 2 further requires that States
“make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account
their grave nature.” CAT, supra note 1, art. 4 ¶ 1.
262.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 8–9 (State Department
analysis of Article 4); Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 15, 40 (prepared
statement and testimony of Mark Richard). Although asserting that existing U.S.
criminal laws sufficiently covered acts taking place on U.S. territory, the
Administration acknowledged a new federal statute would be needed to cover
some extraterritorial conduct, as required by Article 5 of the CAT. President’s
Transmittal, supra note 42, at 10.
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for “complicity” but not acquiescence.263 It does not follow that
officials’ negligent inaction could never breach a legal responsibility
and amount to acquiescence.
Another statement, contained in the State Department
analysis that accompanied the CAT’s transmittal to the Senate,
makes reference to acts that occur “under color of law,” a term of art
drawn from civil rights law that denotes action occurring with
significant State involvement or aid:264
The scope of the Convention is limited to torture
“inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.” Thus, the Convention
applies only to torture that occurs in the context of
governmental authority, excluding torture that occurs
as a wholly private act or, in terms more familiar in
U.S. law, it applies to torture inflicted “under color of
law.’”265
Read in context, however, the “under color of law” analogy in
this passage is used to explain what the phrase “acting in an official
capacity” means and not as a definition of “acquiescence.” In other
words, the person who inflicts, instigates, consents to, or acquiesces
in the act of torture must be acting “under color of law.” If so, the
requisite “context of governmental authority” is present. The
Attorney General and courts have interpreted the torture definition
in that way, treating “under color of law” as the operative test for
determining whether someone is “acting in an official capacity.”266
That is a distinct inquiry from whether that person’s response to the
torturous conduct amounts to “consent or acquiescence.”
263.
Cf. Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, Criminalisation of Torture: State
Obligations Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 115, 124–25 (noting that Article 4 does not expressly link “complicity” with
Article 1’s “consent or acquiescence” and it is unclear “whether every individual
public official sufficiently involved under Art. 1 so as to make the state
responsible would in all cases become individually criminally responsible”).
264.
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A private
individual acts under color of law . . . when he acts together with state officials or
with significant state aid.” (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982))).
265.
President’s Transmittal, supra note 42, at 4.
266.
See Matter of O-F-A-S-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35, 39, 41–42 (A.G. 2020); see
also id. at 37, 39 (citing court decisions that equate “under color of law” with
action “in an official capacity”).
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Two statutes enacted after the Senate’s 1990 ratification of
the CAT used the phrase “under color of law” in identifying
extraterritorial acts of torture that would be criminally punishable or
subject to civil damages. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(TVPA)267 defined torture similarly to the CAT but omitted the CAT
definition’s language on state responsibility.268 However, in creating a
cause of action, it restricted liability to acts of torture or extrajudicial
killing committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation.”269 The Senate Report on the TVPA explains
that its damage remedy was meant to provide a clearer statutory
foundation for the cause of action recognized under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS)270 in the 1980 Filartiga decision, which allowed
noncitizens to sue a former foreign police official in federal district
court for torturing and killing a family member abroad because
“customary international law provides individuals with the right to
be free from torture by government officials.”271 The bill was also
designed to make the Filartiga cause of action available to U.S.
citizens who suffer torture abroad.272 Given these purposes, the
limitation of the damage remedy for State-committed or State-abetted

267.
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note).
268.
Id. § 3(b). The TVPA’s torture definition tracked Article 1 of the CAT
except for the omission of the treaty language requiring some degree of connection
to a public official or person acting in an official capacity. It also added in
language from the Senate ratification understandings that qualified or clarified
certain other aspects of the definition. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6–7 (1991).
269.
Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a).
270.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
271.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991) (discussing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,
416 F.3d 1242, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the ATS provides a cause of
action only for state-sponsored torture and the text of the TVPA likewise
“expressly requires the element of state action”).
272.
See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5. Congress may also have viewed statesponsored torture as particularly heinous and worthy of punishment. See Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigr. and Refugee Affairs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 17 (1990) [hereinafter TVPA Hearing] (Senator Arlen Specter stating that
he introduced the bill to provide a federal remedy “for this kind of outrageous and
horrendous conduct”). There may also have been concerns that allowing suits for
private torture in which officials acquiesced would have led to too many suits in
U.S. courts based on extraterritorial conduct.
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torture (as under the ATS) makes sense and does not suggest that
Congress viewed “acquiescence” under the CAT in narrow terms.273
The phrase “under color of law” appeared again in the 1994
Torture Act,274 which was enacted to implement the United States’
obligation under the CAT to criminalize all acts or attempted acts of
torture and complicity or participation in such acts, not only within
the United States, but also when committed abroad by a U.S.
national or by a non-national offender present in the United States.275
In defining “torture” for purposes of this offense, Congress roughly
tracked the CAT definition but covered only torture “committed by a
person acting under color of law,”276 thereby excluding acts committed
by someone acting in a private capacity but with a public official’s
acquiescence. The Torture Act makes it a criminal offense to commit
273.
The TVPA’s failure to provide a civil damage remedy for some acts
committed abroad that would fall within Article 1’s definition of torture did not
violate U.S. obligations under the CAT. The treaty’s drafting history indicates
that Article 14, on the victim’s right to compensation, was meant to apply only to
torture occurring within a country’s territory. When the U.S. ratified the treaty,
one of the Senate understandings made that limitation explicit. See Resolution of
Ratification, § II(3), 136 CONG. REC. 36,198–99 (1990) (setting out the U.S.
understanding that Article 14 requires providing “a private right of action for
damages only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of
that State Party”); TVPA Hearing, supra note 272, at 19 (testimony of David
Stewart, State Dep’t Assistant Legal Adviser); see also Stewart, supra note 43, at
458–60 (discussing the Bush Administration’s view that the CAT did not require
the United States to provide a civil remedy for any acts of torture committed
abroad). The Senate report on the TVPA asserted that providing a damage
remedy for some torture committed abroad would help to “carry out the intent” of
the CAT but did not dispute the point, made by dissenting committee members,
that the CAT did not require it. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3, 13 (1991); see also S.
REP. NO. 103-107, at 59 (1993) (stating, in a Senate report on the later-passed
Torture Act, that “[c]onsistent with the Senate’s understanding pertaining to
Article 14 of the Convention, the legislation does not create any private right of
action for acts of torture committed outside the territory of the United States”).
274.
Pub. L. 103-236, Tit. V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A). Congress later incorporated by reference the
Torture Act’s definition of torture into a statute creating programs to assist
victims of torture. Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-320, § 3, 112
Stat. 3016 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2152 note). The Congressional findings in that
statute express a special concern with torture used by repressive governments to
terrorize society as a weapon against democracy. Id. § 2(2)–(3).
275.
CAT, supra note 1, arts. 4–5; see also United States v. Belfast, 611
F.3d 783, 802–03 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining the relationship between the
Torture Act and the CAT).
276.
18 U.S.C. § 2340.
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or attempt to commit torture outside the United States or to conspire
to do so.277 The scope of criminal liability mirrored the view expressed
by the Executive Branch at the time of ratification that criminalizing
conspiracy along with actual or attempted acts of torture was enough
to meet U.S. obligations under Article 4 of the CAT.278 The only
federal appeals court decision construing the Torture Act found that
the statute’s “acting under color of law” requirement corresponds to
and is synonymous with the CAT torture definition’s reference to a
“person acting in an official capacity.”279 Once again, Congress did not
use the phrase to define or cabin the meaning of “acquiescence,” a
concept that it simply chose to exclude from the extraterritorial
criminal liability statute.
When Congress enacted FARRA in 1998 to implement Article
3’s non-refoulement requirement in U.S. immigration law, it did not
repeat the TVPA and Torture Act’s “under color of law” formulation.
Instead, it directed agencies to issue regulations giving “torture” and
other terms the same meaning they hold in the CAT, subject to the
reservations, understandings, and other provisions of the Senate
ratification resolution.280 The legislation thus mandated that for
purposes of relief from removal, torturous conduct by private actors
falls within the definition of torture if it occurs with the acquiescence
of a public official or person acting in an official capacity, with the
Senate’s understanding providing the definition for “acquiescence.”281
Congress’ choice not to require a higher degree of state action through
an “under color of law” standard makes sense both to ensure
compliance with the treaty and to serve the distinctive purpose of
Article 3. While the TVPA and Torture Act were designed to impose
penalties on perpetrators, Congress’s purpose in FARRA was
protective—to ensure that individuals are not sent to places where

277.
18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (c).
278.
See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text; Belfast, 611 F.3d at
811–12 (finding Congress fulfilled Article 4’s obligation to criminalize “complicity
or participation” in torture when it made conspiracy to commit torture abroad a
crime).
279.
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 808–09.
280.
FARRA, supra note 49, §§ 1242(a), (b), (f)(2).
281.
Following FARRA, the Justice Department’s CAT regulations
incorporated the Senate understanding on acquiescence verbatim, except for
making it gender-neutral by using “he or she.” Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7),
with Resolution of Ratification, § II(3), 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990).
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they face a danger of torture.282 A victim-centered standard that
focuses on the harm faced by the applicant and requires a lesser
degree of active State involvement is appropriate to this context.
This tour of the history of U.S. ratification and subsequent
legislation leads back to the basic point made earlier—that the U.S.
acquiescence understanding should be given the reading most natural
to its text. Acquiescence exists when a public official is aware of
torturous activity and breaches a legal responsibility to intervene to
prevent such activity. This legal responsibility can derive from any
applicable law, international or domestic.283
The first authoritative agency interpretation of acquiescence
concluded that the “legal responsibility” referred to in the Senate
understanding included duties arising under international law.
Because the United States treated the CAT as non-self-executing
until FARRA and its regulations established procedures for
immigration judges to decide CAT claims in removal proceedings, it
was up to the INS, the agency then responsible for executing
removals, to ensure compliance by not deporting individuals
protected by the treaty.284 In May 1997, the INS General Counsel,
David A. Martin, issued a memorandum explaining the CAT’s
requirements. In discussing the acquiescence understanding, the
memo explained that a public official with knowledge of torture “must
breach a legal duty to prevent the act. Such duty may arise under
either domestic or international law but in no case shall it be less
than what is required by international law.”285 When the Justice
282.
FARRA begins by declaring, “It shall be the policy of the United States
not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to
a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would
be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .” FARRA, supra note 49, § 1242(a).
283.
See supra notes 245–59 and accompanying text.
284.
See supra note 65; see also Matter of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 259–
60 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding immigration judges lacked authority to grant CAT relief
because there was as yet no implementing legislation); id. at 261–64 (Schmidt,
Chairman, dissenting) (describing INS policies aimed at avoiding violations of the
treaty in the interim).
285.
Office of the General Counsel, INS, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Compliance
with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in the Cases of Removable Aliens
(May 14, 1997), at 4, reprinted in 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES, No. 10, Mar. 16,
1998, at 375. Martin also interpreted the understanding to require that an official
“know about the specific act of torture before it occurs,” which was an unduly
narrow reading given the understanding’s use of the broader term “awareness”
and its reference to “activity constituting torture” rather than to a specific act. See
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Department issued the CAT regulations in 1999, it simply
incorporated the Senate understanding into the regulatory definition
of torture without elaborating further on the meaning of “legal
responsibility” in the regulation or official commentary.286 However, it
did not disavow the INS General Counsel’s interpretation of “legal
responsibility” as including international law duties.
In conclusion, U.S. law calls for looking to applicable
international law as well as the domestic law of the country in
question to determine whether officials are abiding by their legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent torture. As Part II explained,
under the CAT, as well as the ICCPR and a number of regional
human rights treaties, that legal responsibility is a duty of due
diligence.287 One question this raises is whether officials who fail to
respond to torture with due diligence can be found to have violated a
legal responsibility under international law if their nation is not a
party to the CAT or any other treaty that imposes such a duty. That
question will rarely arise given that 171 countries have ratified the
CAT and 173 are parties to the ICCPR.288 But at a minimum, all
States should be held to the CAT’s obligations, regardless of whether
they have ratified the treaty. Article 3’s non-refoulement requirement
is designed to prevent persons from being sent to places where they
Rosati, supra note 12, at 538 (“To the extent that the INS position excludes a
public official’s willful blindness or actual knowledge of general torture practices
by requiring a public official to have actual knowledge about a specific act of
torture, the INS position is inconsistent with the Senate understanding of the
treaty obligations.”).
286.
CAT Regulations, supra note 50, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8483, 8491. The
commentary’s only discussion of what acquiescence means was to repeat the
observation made several times in the ratification history that “acquiescence
includes only acts that occur in the context of governmental authority.” Id. at
8483; see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing textual
evidence that this statement encompasses private torturous activity that occurs
with an official’s awareness and breach of legal responsibility).
287.
A legal responsibility could also exist under customary international
law, but it is unclear whether an obligation of due diligence has been so
universally accepted that it has assumed that status. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has asserted that, at least in the area of
gender-motivated violence, a due diligence obligation has ripened into customary
international law. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
288.
See
ICCPR,
UNITED
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=
IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/5U3W-NFBZ ] (listing parties to the ICCPR). For
the due diligence obligation to prevent torture under the ICCPR, see supra notes
143–47 and accompanying text.
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are in danger of being tortured, and it would undermine the treaty’s
object and purpose to allow the return of an individual merely
because of the receiving State’s refusal to acknowledge the CAT’s
fundamental requirement that States take effective measures to
prevent torture.289 If a country’s domestic law, or another treaty it is
party to, imposes more stringent or specific duties, its officials should
be held to those legal responsibilities as well.

IV. IMPLEMENTING A “DUE DILIGENCE” STANDARD
This final Part offers several observations on what a due
diligence test for CAT acquiescence might look like in practice, and
responds to some potential objections. Is it appropriate for U.S. courts
to judge the adequacy of other countries’ efforts? Is due diligence too
vague to be workable? Why not just use the protection-focused
standard of asylum and find acquiescence whenever the State is
unable to prevent torture? This Part also includes a proposal for a
regulatory amendment to help clarify the appropriate standard for
acquiescence.
The general contours of the due diligence standard as
developed by human rights courts and treaty bodies were described in
Section II.A. Two points are particularly worth noting. First, due
diligence is an obligation of means, not results. It requires officials to
take measures within their power and authority that are reasonably
calculated to be effective in preventing and redressing acts of
torture.290 The fact that officials prove unable to prevent torture from
occurring does not necessarily mean they breached a legal duty.
289.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1). Not making protection against removal
depend on whether the receiving country has ratified the CAT is consistent with
the approach taken in the U.S. “lawful sanctions” understanding, under which
punishments authorized under another country’s laws are not considered “lawful”
if they undermine the object and purpose of the CAT. See supra note 248 and
accompanying text.
290.
Commentators broadly agree on this point. See 2019 SR Report, supra
note 180, ¶ 23; Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 310, 327–34; Lisa
Grans, The State Obligation to Prevent Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: The Case of Honour-Related Violence, 15
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 695, 705, 717–18 (2015); Patricia Tarre Moser, The Duty to
Ensure Human Rights and Its Evolution in the Inter-American System:
Comparing Maria da Penha v. Brazil with Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United
States, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 444–45 (2012); Monika Hakimi,
State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L., 341, 371–76 (2010).
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Nonetheless, results are relevant as a benchmark. Article 2 of the
CAT obliges States to take “effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture” in their
territory.291 If the measures taken prove ineffective, the State may
need to revise its approach and expand its efforts. The persistence of
widespread abuses may be evidence that the State is not doing
enough to address the problem.292 For example, a persisting pattern of
violence against women or LGBTQI people may reveal that changes
in laws, police and judicial practices, protective services, and
government messaging are needed in order to adequately investigate,
prosecute, and punish acts of torture, enable victims to access
protection, and address societal attitudes that fuel the violence. And
while due diligence takes into account that there are limits—
stemming both from resource constraints and the need for due
process—on the ability of governmental actors to prevent acts of
torture, the due diligence jurisprudence has been generally hostile to
the idea that States lack the ability to make needed reforms.293
A second and related point is that due diligence operates on
both individual and systemic levels. On the individual level, when
officials become aware that a person faces an imminent risk of torture
they must take reasonable measures to avert the harm and, if it
occurs, take all appropriate steps to investigate, prosecute, and
punish the offender.294 At the systemic level, States have an
291.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
292.
See Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶ 4 (“If the measures adopted by the
State party fail to accomplish the purpose of eradicating acts of torture, the
Convention requires that they be revised and/or that new, more effective
measures be adopted.”); see also Hakimi, supra note 290, at 373–74 (noting that
“the reasonableness of the state’s measures depends on the scope of the problem”
and persisting widespread abuse “is evidence that the state is not doing enough to
satisfy its obligation”); Anhene Boulesbaa, The Nature of the Obligations Incurred
by States Under Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.
53, 62, 72–73, 80 (1990) (observing that the obligation to take effective measures
carries with it an obligation to achieve reasonable results).
293.
See Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 327–33; Hakimi, supra
note 290, at 374–76 (discussing constraints that may affect the measures taken to
prevent human rights violations but observing that courts and treaty bodies
generally expect States to develop the capacity needed to restrain abusers).
294.
U.N. treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, and human rights courts have
repeatedly endorsed this principle. See Hakimi, supra note 290, at 379–81; 2019
SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 23(b); 2016 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶¶ 11–12;
2013 SR VAW Report, supra note 158, ¶ 70; Gen. Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶¶ 18, 21.
These obligations are rooted not only in Article 2’s general requirement that
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obligation to change laws or policies that contribute to a problem of
widespread torturous violence or impede efforts to protect victims.295
In Opuz v. Turkey, for example, the European Court of Human Rights
found that the requirement of Turkish law that criminal charges be
dropped if a victim withdraws her complaint was a contributing
factor to the escalating violence the complainant suffered and that
the law represented a failure by the State to exercise due diligence in
preventing domestic violence.296 In countries where anti-LGBTQI
attacks occur regularly, enacting or failing to repeal legislation that
criminalizes same-sex relationships violates the due diligence duty
because such laws contribute to a climate of violence against LGBTQI
people and have the predictable effect of deterring victims from
seeking help from the authorities.297 Statements by influential
officials or state-endorsed leaders that encourage or condone violence
against members of a societally-disfavored group can also represent a
failure of due diligence that makes the State responsible when such
attacks occur.298
States take effective preventive measures, but also in the more specific
requirements of Article 4 (duty to criminalize acts of torture and make them
punishable by appropriate penalties), Article 6 (duty to take offenders into
custody when the available information warrants), Articles 12–13 (duty to conduct
a prompt and impartial investigation and protect complainant and witnesses from
retaliation), and Article 14 (duty to provide access to avenues for redress).
295.
Special rapporteurs and scholars have highlighted this aspect of due
diligence. See 2019 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 23(a); 2013 SR VAW Report,
supra note 158, ¶¶ 70–75; Grans, supra note 290, at 713–15; Goldscheid &
Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 307–09; Hakimi, supra note 290, at 382–83.
296.
Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 137-46, 168 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
June 9, 2009). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 153–56 and
accompanying text.
297.
See 2016 SR Report, supra note 180, ¶ 15 (discussing the link between
the criminalization of LGBTQI persons and violence against the LGBTQI
community by both state and non-State actors); see also Human Rights Council,
19th Sess., Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN
Doc. A/HRC/19/41, ¶ 42 (2011) (making similar observations).
298.
A substantial body of social science research supports the conclusion
that certain kinds of denigrating speech that dehumanizes members of an outgroup have conditioning effects on listeners that can contribute to their
willingness to tolerate or engage in violent attacks, especially when the speaker
holds authority. See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL l7–18, 223–
47 (2017); Jonathan Leader Maynard & Susan Benesch, Dangerous Speech and
Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention, 9
GENOCIDE STUDS. & PREVENTION INT’L J. 70, 77–86 (2016); see also 2019 SR
Report, supra note 180, ¶ 21 (finding that statements by political/religious leaders
endorsing domestic or honor-based violence and discriminatory political
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The due diligence standard differs from the “willful blindness”
approach in two major respects. Officials who “turn a blind eye” to
torturous activity are unquestionably not exercising due diligence and
will be guilty of acquiescence under either approach. But due
diligence also captures situations where officials, while not totally
passive, fail to do all that can reasonably be expected of them to
protect the victim and prosecute and appropriately punish the
perpetrators. Cases in which appellate courts have upheld noacquiescence findings in situations where the authorities responded
in a half-hearted or pro forma way when a threat or act of torture was
reported, or where country evidence shows that officials are likely to
respond in a less-than-diligent way to the harm the applicant faces
(for example, where there is a pattern of gang or cartel infiltration of
police departments, or men committing serious acts of domestic
violence are routinely only briefly detained and then released), should
come out differently under a due diligence test. 299
The willful blindness standard also does not easily
accommodate viewing systemic failures that contribute to the
perpetuation of torture as a form of acquiescence. Due diligence
provides a framework for examining whether the measures taken by
the State to address a problem of torturous violence are reasonable
and proportional to the gravity of the situation, or conversely,
whether its failures to take needed steps to address the problem
contributes to the risk of torture the applicant faces.300 For example,
in Fuentes-Erazo, where the Eighth Circuit found no acquiescence
even though it acknowledged that the record showed widespread
impunity for domestic violence in Honduras, ineffectual laws and
institutions to protect victims, and the government’s failure to
provide necessary resources to address the problem,301 a due diligence
standard would have compelled a different outcome. And in those
cases where appellate courts have found acquiescence based on

narratives that encourage violence against marginalized groups may amount to
incitement under the CAT’s torture definition).
299.
For discussion of case examples, see supra notes 115–20, 132–33 and
accompanying text.
300.
As the Committee Against Torture explained in its General Comment
No. 2, the State is responsible in “contexts where the failure of the State to
intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted harm.” Gen.
Cmt. 2, supra note 38, ¶ 15.
301.
Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 850–54 (8th Cir. 2017). For
further discussion of this case, see supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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systemic failures—as in a Seventh Circuit decision finding that
Jordan acquiesces to honor killings, even though it prosecutes
offenders, because it has not changed laws that enable men
committing them to receive light sentences and offers no mechanism
to protect targeted women besides protective custody302—the results
make more sense when acquiescence is conceptualized as a failure to
exercise due diligence, rather than as “willful blindness.”
One possible objection to using a due diligence standard is
that it requires passing judgment on the adequacy of another State’s
preventive efforts, which implicates sensitive foreign policy concerns.
A government may be offended by the charge that it fails to act
diligently to protect its citizens from torture. One might argue that if
such accusations are to be made, they should come from foreign policy
officials, not judges.303 In actuality, it is rare that another country
cares why the United States declines to deport someone; governments
are usually happy not to be required to take back disgruntled citizens
who have emigrated.304 On occasion, though, another country may
take offense if a court impugns the diligence of its anti-torture efforts.
So what? That is precisely what the CAT calls for—the treaty
requires all State parties to determine, before returning someone,
whether that person would be in danger of being tortured by, or with
the consent or acquiescence of, officials in another country.305 To the

302.
Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2011).
303.
Cf. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 332 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that
giving Chevron deference to the agency standard on whether a country’s
government is responsible for persecution in asylum cases based on its inability to
control the persecutors is particularly appropriate because it is “a matter of no
small significance to foreign relations”).
304.
See Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of
Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 174–75 (2019) (“And though
immigration decisions are sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign
relations, the truth of the matter is that it is the very unusual case that affects
anyone or anything other than the parties themselves.”).
305.
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 7, 1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 (on file with the
Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (explaining that the issue is whether the
sending country is violating its own treaty obligation not to return a person to a
place where that individual would face torture or inhumane treatment, which
inescapably requires assessing conditions in the country of removal against the
treaty’s standards); see also William M. Cohen, Implementing the U.N. Torture
Convention in Extradition Proceedings, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 517, 531
(1998) (observing that the interests of comity have little weight as an objection to
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extent that this involves calling out another country for failing to live
up to its obligations under the treaty, calling attention to the problem
serves the CAT’s purposes by providing feedback that may help to
spur reforms.306 Without a due diligence standard for acquiescence,
courts would still be obliged to determine whether a CAT applicant
faces likely torture at the hands of State officials, or with an official’s
consent or willful blindness. Those higher levels of culpability, if
anything, pose more sensitive foreign policy concerns than basing a
CAT grant on the failure of officials to exercise due diligence to
prevent privately inflicted torture.
Another difficulty posed by the due diligence standard is its
imprecision. The standard assesses the reasonableness of measures
taken to prevent torture and the seriousness of officials’ efforts to
implement them. It does not offer clear benchmarks on exactly what
measures are required or how much effort is enough.307 But that
hardly distinguishes it from other reasonableness standards in the
law; adjudicators are accustomed to making fact- and context-specific
judgments about what is reasonable in any given set of
circumstances.
One might also be concerned with information deficits—will
immigration judges have the necessary knowledge to accurately
assess the adequacy of other States’ efforts? That problem, however,
is endemic to asylum adjudication, in which judges must assess
conditions in foreign countries in order to determine how likely it is
an individual will face persecution and whether the applicant’s
account of past events is credible.308 Judges are able to make those
determinations by examining evidence from reputable governmental,
NGO and journalistic sources, often with the aid of expert
testimony.309 Applying a due diligence standard will certainly present
courts determining whether extradition would violate the CAT, given that it is a
treaty enforcing a universally recognized prohibition of torture).
306.
Cf. MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM 24–26, 57–58, 69–81,
93–94 (2009) (discussing the condemnatory and expressive functions of States
granting asylum to individuals persecuted by other countries).
307.
See Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 141, at 310–11, 322–23, 339–
41; Edwards, supra note 165, at 215 (noting the difficulties of determining the
precise measures States are required to take).
308.
See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating
the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1270–85 (1990).
309.
See Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 97, 100 (B.I.A. 2020) (noting
“Immigration Judges have long relied on expert testimony . . . to help them make
factual determinations”); Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724–28, 732
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some hard cases. But in most cases involving deportation to a country
where privately-committed abuses such as domestic violence or
torture by organized criminal entities are widespread, it should be
relatively easy to identify, from readily available country evidence,
whether there are serious deficiencies in the governmental response
that allow abuses to continue unchecked.
A due diligence approach to acquiescence can also be
criticized for not going far enough. It allows people to be deported to
face torture by non-State actors in situations where officials, despite
their diligent efforts, cannot provide protection. The standard used
for asylum, which asks whether the government is unable or
unwilling to control the persecutors, would be more protective and
better serve the objective of preventing all torture.310 It is difficult,
however, to construe the CAT’s torture definition and U.S. law as
allowing an exclusive focus on the likelihood of torture without regard
to whether public officials would be, at least to some degree, at fault.
When Congress enacted FARRA, it required the immigration
agencies to adopt the CAT’s torture definition and the Senate
understanding of “acquiescence.”311 If officials take all reasonable
measures within their authority to prevent an act of torture but are

(B.I.A. 1997) (discussing the important role of country background information in
adjudicating asylum claims).
310.
Some commentators have proposed interpreting acquiescence under
the CAT as equivalent to the “unable or unwilling” standard applied under the
Refugee Convention. See FANNY DE WECK, NON-REFOULEMENT UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE 214, 225–27 (2017); Vining, supra note 220, at 355–60; McCorquodale &
La Forgia, supra note 73, at 217; Weissbrodt & Höreiter, supra note 208, at 51–
52. The Refugee Convention, however, differs from the CAT in that it includes no
language requiring the State to bear responsibility for persecution, but instead
focuses on whether an individual is “unable, or owing to such fear [of persecution],
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” Refugee
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2). See Walter Kälin, Non-State Agents of
Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415,
418, 423 (2001). Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
has been interpreted to bar refoulement if a person faces likely torture from
private actors, regardless of whether the receiving country’s authorities bear any
responsibility for it, similarly lacks the limiting language of the CAT’s torture
definition. See Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04 ¶¶ 135, 147
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-78986 (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
311.
FARRA, supra note 49, § 1242(b), (f); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), (a)(7).
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still not able to stop it, it is simply implausible to say that they have
breached their legal responsibility and acquiesced to the conduct.312
A due diligence standard provides the highest degree of
protection against private torture that U.S. law and the CAT’s
definition of torture will allow.313 It is more protective than the
current, willful-blindness-based jurisprudence. It is grounded in the
core requirement of CAT Article 2 that States take effective measures
to prevent acts of torture, and it accurately reflects what the United
States understood acquiescence to mean when it proposed adding the
term to the CAT’s torture definition during the treaty negotiations.
No change in the CAT regulations is needed for courts to
conclude that when officials aware of torturous activity fail to
312.
See STEVEN DEWULF, THE SIGNATURE OF EVIL: (RE)DEFINING
TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 496 (2011) (explaining that human rights
treaties cannot be plausibly construed to hold a State responsible for torture by
private actors if the State has done all that can reasonably be expected of it to
prevent such conduct).
313.
Much of the gap in protection that remains for situations in which the
State makes diligent efforts but cannot prevent torture could be filled if U.S. case
law would recognize that non-State entities exercising effective control over
territory, such as guerilla groups or gangs in some areas, are de facto public
officials and should be treated as “person[s] acting in an official capacity” under
the CAT. Under this analysis, any torturous acts they commit are “inflicted by” an
official, and there is no need to consider whether the country’s government
acquiesces. The U.N. Committee Against Torture has endorsed this approach. See
Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of
Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. C/GC/2
(2018) (stating individuals should not be deported to places where they would be
tortured “at the hands of non-State entities . . . over which the receiving State has
no or only partial de facto control”); S.S. v. Netherlands, No. 191/2001, ¶ 6.4, U.N.
Doc. CAT /C/30/D/191/2001 (2003) (stating Article 3 applies if a person faces
torture from a “non-governmental entity [that] occupies and exercises quasigovernmental authority over the territory”); see also David, supra note 205, at 795
(arguing for this approach in U.S. implementation of the CAT). No precedential
decision of the BIA or federal courts has yet adopted this approach, although the
Second Circuit has invited the BIA to consider it. See Hernandez-Hernandez v.
Barr, 789 Fed. App’x 898, 902 (2d Cir. 2019) (directing the BIA to give reasoned
consideration to whether the MS-13 in El Salvador is a de facto state actor under
the CAT); Gomez-Beleno v. Mukasey, 291 Fed. App’x 411, 414 (2d Cir. 2008)
(remanding for consideration of whether the FARC should be treated as the de
facto government of parts of Colombia). But see D-Muhumed v. Att’y Gen., 388
F.3d 814, 815–16, 820 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that harm inflicted by Somali
clans could not meet the CAT’s torture definition because Somalia had no central
government and “the clans who control various sections of the country do so
through continued warfare and not official power”).
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exercise due diligence to prevent it, they breach their responsibility
under international law and thereby acquiesce. However, an
amendment along the lines of the following could help to clarify the
appropriate standard and shift adjudicators away from the prevailing
misuse of “willful blindness” as a stand-in for acquiescence:
Acquiescence of a public official requires that the
public official, prior to the activity constituting
torture, have awareness of such activity and
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to
intervene to prevent such activity. Such legal
responsibility may arise under either domestic or
international law but in no case shall it be less than
what is required by international law. Acquiescence
shall include any failure by a public official to act with
due diligence by taking appropriate measures to
prevent or suppress torturous activity when the
official has awareness it has been or is being
committed and has the authority or is in the position
to take such measures. 314
The first added sentence is drawn from the 1997
memorandum issued by the INS General Counsel when the agency
began applying the CAT in removal proceedings,315 and the second is
based on the language U.S. diplomats used to explain the meaning of
“acquiescence” when the United States proposed adding the term to
the CAT’s torture definition.316 The United States stated that in
proposing the “acquiescence” concept, it sought to ensure that “public
officials have a clear duty to act to prevent torture.”317 The above
amendment to the CAT regulations would effectuate that original
intent.

314.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (2020) (emphasis added). The first sentence is
the current text of the acquiescence regulation, and the two underlined sentences
that follow are proposed additions.
315.
See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
316.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Summary, supra note 212, ¶¶ 29, 45 (defining
acquiescence in connection with the duty of a public official “to take appropriate
measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has knowledge or
should have knowledge that torture has or is being committed and has the
authority or is in the position to take such measures”); see also supra notes 212–
13, 238–40 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. proposal).
317.
See Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Summary, supra note 212, ¶ 29.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the U.S. CAT jurisprudence has
taken a wrong turn by requiring applicants who face torture by nonState actors to prove that a public official is likely to respond with
“willful blindness.” When public officials are aware that an individual
is in danger of torture, or are aware of a pattern of torturous activity
targeting similarly-situated people, the definition of “acquiescence”
that the Senate adopted when the United States ratified the treaty
makes it clear that the relevant question becomes: Is it likely that a
public official will “breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene
to prevent such activity”?318
“Willful blindness” may at times be germane to whether the
awareness element of the acquiescence definition has been met,
because, as legislative history emphasizes, officials who turn a blind
eye to torture should not be let off the hook by consciously avoiding
definite knowledge. But willful blindness was never designed to be
the test for determining whether officials have breached a legal
responsibility. As a result of the judicial fixation on willful blindness,
many CAT applicants, including victims of severe gender-based or
homophobic violence and persons targeted by gangs or drug cartels,
face deportation and torture in countries where systemic deficiencies
in laws, enforcement, and protective services deprive them of effective
protection.
The CAT and other human rights treaties impose a legal
obligation on public officials to exercise due diligence to prevent,
investigate, punish, and remedy acts of torture, including those
committed by private parties. Both the plain text of the U.S.
acquiescence understanding and its history support looking to
international law, as well as any applicable national law, to
determine the scope of officials’ legal responsibility to intervene. Due
diligence provides the appropriate standard, grounded in
international law, for determining whether officials have lived up to
that legal responsibility, or have breached it and thereby acquiesced
to torture.

318.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); see also Resolution of Ratification, § II(1)(d),
136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990) (containing the Senate understanding that was
incorporated in the regulation).

